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Introduction 
This is a perilous time for world trade. Having recovered from a steep 
decline at the outset of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis,1 world trade 
is once again facing risks of decelerating growth amid continued weak-
nesses in the world economy.2 Adding to these growth concerns are 
worrying signs that efforts to further liberalize global trade are unraveling3 
and nations are showing a greater tendency to resort to protectionist trade 
measures.4 These “growing protectionist measures,” in the words of an in-
                                                                                                                           
 1. World trade collapsed at the outset of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. Begin-
ning in the fourth quarter of 2008, all of the major economies in the world experienced a sharp 
decline in international trade. “The peak-to-trough decline in nominal imports for the major 
economies ranged from thirty percent for the [European Union (EU)] to forty-nine percent for 
South Africa.” Chad P. Bown, Introduction, in The Great Recession and Import Protec-
tion: The Role of Temporary Trade Barriers 1, 5 (Chad P. Bown ed., 2011). But world 
trade quickly recovered afterward, and in some countries reached or exceeded precrisis levels 
by 2010. See id. at 8–9, fig.1.2. 
 2. In September 2011, the World Trade Organization (WTO) revised down its 2012 
growth forecast for global trade in goods from 6.5% to 5.8%. Tom Barkley & Bob Davis, 
WTO Chief Warns Against Protectionism, Wall St. J. (Sept. 23, 2011), http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904563904576587213632564644.html. 
 3. The WTO Doha Round negotiations, which had been dragging on for almost ten 
years, suffered another setback in April 2011, when WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy stat-
ed that “differences between countries over how much to cut manufactured goods tariffs were 
‘unbridgeable.’ ” Doug Palmer, Analysis: WTO Faces Tough Choices After Latest Doha Set-
back, Reuters, Apr. 21, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/21/ 
us-trade-wto-doha-idUSTRE73K8I220110421. 
 4. In November 2011, Global Trade Alert, a network of trade analysts associated 
with the U.K.-based think tank Center for Economic Policy Research, published a report 
“finding that the initial reports of the incidence of protectionism in the third quarter of 2011 
were as high as the most troubling quarters in 2009—when protectionist fears were at their 
peak early in the global economic crisis.” Len Bracken, Trade Analyst Organization 
Finds Surge in Protectionist Measures in Third Quarter, Bloomberg 
BNA Int’l Trade Daily (Nov. 23, 2011), http://news.bna.com/tdln/TDLNWB/split_ 
display.adp?fedfid=23671834&vname=itdbulallissues&fcn=2&wsn=500914000&fn=23671834 
&split=0 (requires subscription). The same report also found that “new protectionist measures 
since July [2011] outnumber[ed] liberalizing measures by nearly three to one.” Id. The report 
gave a pessimistic outlook for trade liberalization, citing protectionist pressures caused by “a 
deteriorating macroeconomic climate.” Id. 
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fluential business-news organization covering world trade issues, are 
“cast[ing] a dark cloud over global trade.”5  
A key component of the protectionist trade measures that are threaten-
ing to derail world economic recovery is trade remedy measures. The term 
trade remedy measures or, simply, trade remedies, generally refers to three 
types of import restrictions authorized under national and international 
trade laws: antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards.6 An-
tidumping duties are additional tariffs imposed on imports that are sold at 
“less than fair value” and sufficiently injure a domestic industry of the im-
porting country.7 Countervailing duties are extra tariffs imposed on imports 
that benefit from certain subsidies conferred by foreign governments or 
public entities and sufficiently injure a domestic industry of the importing 
country.8 Safeguards, or safeguard measures, are restrictions on imports 
imposed in the event of import surges to allow domestic industries of the 
importing country to make positive adjustments to import competition.9 
Because safeguards must be applied to all imports regardless of their 
source under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO),10 I refer to 
them as global safeguards in this Article.  
                                                                                                                           
 5. Daniel Pruzin, Outlook 2012: Growing Protectionist Pressures Cast Dark Cloud 
over Global Trade, Bloomberg BNA Int’l Trade Daily (Jan. 23, 2012), http:// 
news.bna.com/tdln/TDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=24364150&vname=itdbulallissues& 
wsn=500048000&searchid=17013526&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=
TDLNWB&pg=0 (requires subscription). 
 6. Alan O. Sykes, International Trade: Trade Remedies, in Research Handbook in 
International Economic Law 62, 62 (Andrew T. Guzman & Alan O. Sykes eds., 2007).  
 7. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2011) (providing for the imposition of antidumping du-
ties on imports sold in the United States “at less than . . . fair value” when such imports cause 
or threaten to cause “material injury” to a domestic industry or “materially retard” the “estab-
lishment of a domestic industry”); see also Council Regulation 1225/2009, art. 1.1, 2009 O.J. 
(L 343) 51, 53 [hereinafter EU Antidumping Regulation] (“An anti-dumping duty may be ap-
plied to any dumped product whose release for free circulation in the Community causes 
injury.”). 
 8. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2011) (providing for the imposition of countervailing 
duties on imports that receive a “countervailable subsidy” from a foreign country or “a public 
entity within the territory” of foreign country when such imports cause or “threaten” to cause 
“material injury” to a domestic industry or “materially retard” the “establishment of a domes-
tic industry”); see also id. § 1677(5) (defining “countervailable subsidy”).  
 9. See, e.g., id. § 2251 (providing for “presidential action” when an article of mer-
chandise “is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a 
substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an 
article like or directly in competition with the imported article”); see also Council Regulation 
260/2009, art. 16.1, 2009 O.J. (L 84) 1, 7 (providing for the imposition of certain “safeguard 
measures” when “a product is imported into the Community in such greatly increased quanti-
ties and/or on such terms or conditions as to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to 
Community producers”). 
 10. Agreement on Safeguards art. 2(2), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 104 [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards] (“Safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported 
irrespective of its source.”). 
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The use of trade remedies has become a major theme in world trade. 
Since the early 1980s, the major economies of the world have greatly re-
duced their import-tariff levels through a number of multilateral and 
bilateral trade agreements.11 However, many of these economies have also 
increasingly resorted to trade remedies, “resulting in exporters being sim-
ultaneously subject to low applied tariffs on average but additional—and 
frequently added and removed—trade remedy tariffs.”12 Between 1979 and 
2007, WTO member countries initiated 205 antidumping, 26 countervail-
ing duty, and 12 safeguard investigations per year on average, and applied 
113 antidumping, 11 countervailing duty, and 7 safeguard measures per 
year on average.13 Particularly, the use of trade remedies spiked during the 
2008–2009 global financial crisis, with the number of new product-level 
trade remedy investigations in the first quarter of 2009 logging a 22.3% 
increase over the same period in 2008.14 The number of new product-level 
trade remedy investigations in 2008 was, in turn, thirty-four percent higher 
than in 2007.15 More ominously, the countries that actively use trade rem-
                                                                                                                           
 11. For example, the Uruguay Round negotiations under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) achieved “across-the-board tariff cuts for industrial countries aver-
aging 40 percent.” Robert J. Carbaugh, International Economics 194 (13th ed. 2011). 
As a result of the Uruguay Round, “[t]ariffs were eliminated entirely in several sectors, includ-
ing steel, medical equipment, construction equipment, pharmaceuticals, and paper.” Id. The 
reductions in tariff levels have led Professor Raj Bhala to declare that “[t]ariffs no longer mat-
ter in international trade law.” Raj Bhala, Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 Geo. Wash. J. 
Int’l L. & Econ. 1, 3 (1995). The statistics cited by Professor Bhala are convincing: average 
tariffs in industrial countries plummeted from 40% in 1947, when the GATT entered into 
force, to 6.3% in 1994 just prior to the entry into force of the Uruguay Round agreements, and 
further to 3.9% as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements. Id. 
 12. Chad P. Bown, Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards, and Countervailing Du-
ties, 1990–2009, at 2 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 
5436, 2010), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent 
Server/IW3P/IB/2010/09/28/000158349_20100928091836/Rendered/PDF/WPS5436.pdf. 
 13. World Trade Org. [WTO], World Trade Report 2009: Trade Policy Com-
mitments and Contingency Measures 133 (2009) [hereinafter World Trade Report 
2009], available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report 
09_e.pdf. Investigations in the trade remedies context refer to proceedings in which govern-
ment authorities charged with trade remedy determinations investigate the existence of causes 
for trade remedies. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1) (2011) (providing for procedures for an-
tidumping duty investigations). A trade remedy investigation is usually initiated through 
petition by parties that are generally referred to as petitioners. See, e.g., id. § 1673a(b) 
(providing for initiation of antidumping duty investigations by petition). The foreign exporters 
or producers of the subject merchandise that participate in trade remedy proceedings are gen-
erally referred to as respondents. See, e.g., id. § 1673a(b)(3)(A) (providing for methods of 
determining antidumping duty margins for foreign exporters and producers of the subject 
merchandise). A trade remedy measure will be put in place if the result of the investigation is 
affirmative.  
 14. Chad P. Bown, The Global Resort to Antidumping, Safeguards, and Other Trade 
Remedies Amidst the Economic Crisis, in Effective Crisis Response and Openness: Impli-
cations for the Trading System 91, 94 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2009). 
 15. Id. 
Zheng Autoprint Corrected_C.doc 1/8/2013 3:55 PM 
Fall 2012] Reforming Trade Remedies 155 
edies have in recent years expanded from several developed countries to 
include a number of developing countries, which accounted for seventy-
four percent of all new trade remedy investigations conducted between the 
first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.16  
The increased use of trade remedies is primarily driven by one par-
ticular trade remedy instrument—antidumping, which has become known 
as the “most important non-tariff trade barrier.”17 Between 1980 and 2003, 
the number of countries that had adopted an antidumping law increased 
from thirty-six to ninety-seven.18 Between 1981 and 2001, at least 4597 
antidumping investigations were initiated worldwide.19 For 2007 alone, 
WTO members reported initiating a total of 163 antidumping investiga-
tions.20 That number increased to 208 in 2008,21 before falling to 153—still 
an elevated level—in 2011.22 Fifteen WTO members reported a similar in-
crease in the number of newly applied antidumping measures, from 107 in 
2007 to 138 in 2008.23 In a development consistent with the trend seen for 
overall trade remedy measures, developing countries have emerged in re-
cent years as the new users of antidumping. Between 1995 and 2001, with 
the exception of one year, the share of antidumping investigations initiated 
by new-user countries exceeded fifty percent.24  
In stark contrast to their popularity with governments that use them, 
trade remedies have been subject to scathing criticisms by economists and 
legal scholars. Particularly, the primary weapon in the trade remedy arse-
nal—antidumping—has received near-unanimous disapproval from 
scholars. Many commentators have criticized its lack of sound economic  
 
                                                                                                                           
 16. Id. at 96. 
 17. See Maurizio Zanardi, Anti-dumping: What Are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?, 
27 World Econ. 403, 403 (2004). 
 18. Hylke Vandenbussche & Maurizio Zanardi, What Explains the Proliferation of An-
tidumping Laws?, 23 Econ. Pol’y 94, 94 (2008). 
 19. Zanardi, supra note 17, at 412–13. 
 20. World Trade Report 2009, supra note 13, at 133. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 155, chart 5; Daniel Pruzin, WTO Chief Claims ‘Significant Decline’ in 
Worldwide Antidumping Investigation, Bloomberg BNA Int’l Trade Rep. (Feb. 28, 2012), 
http://news.bna.com/tdln/TDLNWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=24753837&vname=itdbulallissu
es&fcn=2&wsn=499861000&fn=24753837&split=0 (quoting WTO Dir.-Gen. Pascal Lamy) 
(requires subscription). 
 23. World Trade Report 2009, supra note 13, at 133.  
 24. Zanardi, supra note 17, at 414–18 tbl.2. 
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rationales,25 bias in administration,26 and strategic or retaliatory nature.27 
The clear consensus among legal scholars and economists is that antidump-
ing is not about remedying unfair trade practices, as it purports to be, but 
                                                                                                                           
 25. See, e.g., Douglas A. Irwin, Free Trade Under Fire 162 (3d ed. 2009) (arguing 
that international price discrimination is neither unfair nor a problem unless it harms competi-
tion); John J. Barceló III, Antidumping Laws As Barriers to Trade—The United States and the 
International Antidumping Code, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 491, 502–13 (1972) (rejecting the ar-
guments that dumping is an “unfair trade practice,” confers an “artificial advantage,” 
“exploit[s] monopoly power,” and “inflict[s] injurious adjustment costs”); Bhala, supra note 
11, at 8–21 (criticizing the economic rationales of antidumping); Reid M. Bolton, Anti-
dumping and Distrust: Reducing Anti-dumping Duties Under the W.T.O. Through Heightened 
Scrutiny, 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 66, 71–74 (2011) (rejecting various economic justifications 
for antidumping); Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How Antidumping Measures 
Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 357, 370–76 (2009) (criticizing the “unfair trade” 
rationale of antidumping); Brian Hindley, The Economics of Dumping and Anti-dumping Action: 
Is There a Baby in the Bath Water?, in Policy Implications of Antidumping Measures 25, 30 
(P.K.M. Tharakan ed., 1991) (questioning the right of an importing country to take action when 
foreign firms charge a higher price in their home markets than in the importing country); Ber-
nard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust, J. World 
Trade, Feb. 1996, at 27, 28–31 (arguing that antidumping laws are no longer consistent with 
the objectives of competition law); N. Gregory Mankiw & Philip L. Swagel, Antidumping: 
The Third Rail of Trade Policy, Foreign Aff., July–Aug. 2005, at 107, 107–19 (critiquing the 
economic rationales of antidumping); Robert W. McGee, Antidumping Laws: A Bright Future 
for a Bad Idea 2–4 (Dumont Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, Paper No. 12, 1996), available at 
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/7380.pdf (reject-
ing the “predatory pricing” justification for antidumping). 
 26. One critic has pointed out that “the antidumping process is riddled with subtle 
tricks and arbitrary biases that invariably favor the domestic petitioner.” Irwin, supra note 25, 
at 160; see also Cho, supra note 25, at 386–89 (criticizing the procedural burdens and lack of 
“impartiality or other due process values” in antidumping proceedings); Michael A. Lawrence, 
Bias in the International Trade Administration: The Need for Impartial Decisionmakers in 
United States Antidumping Proceedings, 26 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 1 (1994) (detailing the 
biases against foreign producers in U.S. antidumping proceedings as administered by the In-
ternational Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce); Robert W. McGee, The 
Case to Repeal the Antidumping Laws, 13 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 491, 496–501 (1993) (criti-
cizing the biases against foreign producers in the administration of U.S. antidumping law). 
 27. See generally Joseph F. Francois & Gunnar Niels, Ctr. for Econ. Policy Re-
search, Political Influence in a New Antidumping Regime: Evidence from Mexico 
(CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4297, 2004), available at http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/6694/2004-
0112.pdf (showing that antidumping investigations initiated by Mexico within twelve months 
after a particular country had started an antidumping investigation against Mexico are three 
times as likely to result in a positive outcome); Aradhna Aggarwal, Macro Economic Determi-
nants of Anti-dumping: A Comparative Analysis of Developed and Developing Countries, 32 
World Dev. 1043 (2004) (using data from ninety-nine active users of antidumping to show a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between the number of antidumping investi-
gations against a developing country and the number of antidumping investigations that 
country initiates itself); Vandenbussche & Zanardi, supra note 18 (using econometric studies 
to show that retaliatory motives are at the heart of the proliferation of antidumping law); 
Thomas J. Prusa & Susan Skeath, The Economic and Strategic Motives for Antidumping Fil-
ings (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8424, 2001) available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8424.pdf (using antidumping filing data from 1980 to 1998 to 
demonstrate the importance of “strategic concerns,” or retaliation, in antidumping filings). 
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about protecting the domestic producers of the importing country.28 As for 
countervailing duty laws, they have been criticized for their adverse impact 
on economic welfare,29 their incoherent rules,30 and their lack of a clear pur-
pose.31 Finally, the global safeguard has also been criticized for operating 
under many difficult conceptual and interpretative issues.32 Indeed, there is 
perhaps no other body of law that is so frequently used and is of such impact 
on policy and practice yet whose major components are so widely perceived 
as meritless or problematic. 
Consistent with their overwhelmingly negative assessments of trade 
remedy laws, many scholars advocate the abolition of key components of 
trade remedy laws, particularly antidumping laws.33 Those proposals have 
failed to influence lawmakers and policy makers, however, as shown by the 
fact that trade remedies are still widely in use today, with all of their defects 
intact.  
This Article aims to restart the debate on trade remedies by offering new 
perspectives on the fundamental defects of the current trade remedy regime 
and proposing a bold yet feasible road map for reforms. As shall become 
clear, the debate on trade remedies is an essential component of the broader 
debate on trade protectionism, an issue that has never been more important 
in light of the challenges facing the world economy today. Reforming trade 
                                                                                                                           
 28. Bhala, supra note 11, at 20 (“The harsh reality is that antidumping law remains a 
strategic weapon in the protectionist arsenal.”); Cho, supra note 25, at 367 (“[T]he very histo-
ry of antidumping reveals that the major purpose of the antidumping statute is sheer 
protectionism . . . .”); J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regula-
tion 1 (World Bank Country Econ. Dep’t, Policy, Research & External Affairs Series Working 
Paper No. 783, 1991), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContent 
Server/WDSP/IB/1991/10/01/000009265_3961002001146/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf 
(“There is little in that history to suggest that antidumping ever had a scope more particular 
than protecting home producers from import competition, and there is much to suggest that 
such protection was its intended scope.”). 
 29. See Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 
Colum. L. Rev. 199, 213–29 (1989) (arguing that countervailing duties result in a net welfare 
loss under most circumstances). 
 30. See infra notes 253–254 and accompanying text. 
 31. Scholars have struggled to understand what purposes countervailing duty laws 
serve. Many scholars have considered, and rejected, the notion that countervailing duty laws 
are aimed at promoting economic efficiency through deterring the use of subsidies. See infra 
note 252 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that the purpose of countervailing duty 
laws is to protect the entitlement of domestic producers, but that purpose is not entirely con-
sistent with the current rules of countervailing duty laws. See infra note 254 and 
accompanying text.  
 32. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 33. For proposals to abolish antidumping laws, see generally Wesley K. Caine, A Case 
for Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930, 13 Law & Pol’y Int’l 
Bus. 681 (1981); J. Michael Finger, Reform, in Antidumping: How It Works and Who 
Gets Hurt 57 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993); McGee, supra note 26. For a proposal to abolish 
countervailing duty laws, see generally Sykes, supra note 29. 
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remedies, therefore, has far-reaching implications for the global trade agen-
da. 
This Article proposes a redesign of the overall trade remedy regime, 
with an emphasis on antidumping, the linchpin of trade remedies. I argue 
that the persistent stalemate over antidumping reforms stems largely from 
the fact that the two sides in the antidumping debate have not been engaging 
each other. While critics of antidumping focus on the economic rationales of 
antidumping (or the lack thereof), supporters or sympathizers of 
antidumping instead defend the trade remedy instrument as an indispensable 
safety valve for protectionist pressures. I contend that the correct approach 
to antidumping falls somewhere between the views espoused by the two 
camps. The correct approach, as discussed below, is to recognize the 
potential value of antidumping in performing the safety-valve function 
while also examining how well antidumping performs that function. 
Proceeding with this line of analysis, I demonstrate that the real problem 
with antidumping is not that it is protectionist, but that it is protectionist in 
ways that are bad for trade policy. Specifically, antidumping is a faulty 
safety valve in that it provides arbitrary levels of protection for petitioners, 
results in unnecessary uncertainties for respondents, and has too low a 
threshold for activation (that is, too low a standard for injury 
determinations). Furthermore, antidumping exacerbates the democracy 
deficit in trade policy, as the mechanical formulas used for calculating 
antidumping duties deprive the trade remedy process of the democratic 
participation that is essential for seeking consensus and compromises on 
trade protectionism. In light of these defects of antidumping, the goal of 
antidumping reforms should be to design a trade remedy instrument that 
better performs the safety-valve function while facilitating the formation of 
societal consensus on trade protectionism through maximizing democratic 
participation in the trade remedy process.34 
In this Article, I propose exactly such a trade remedy instrument. I pro-
pose to eliminate the unfair-pricing component of antidumping, increase the 
injury standard under antidumping, and require a public interest clause in 
the antidumping process. In all other respects, the new trade remedy instru-
ment will inherit the existing features of antidumping. Essentially, the 
reform will replace antidumping with a country-specific safeguard equipped 
with a heightened injury standard and a mandatory public interest require-
ment. I demonstrate that this country-specific safeguard comports with the 
policy goals of trade remedies as identified in this Article. Furthermore, the 
country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article is politically feasible, as 
it preserves an effective trade-protection mechanism for petitioners and 
trade-policy makers. By contrast, as is demonstrated in this Article, the 
global safeguard currently in use could not perform the safety-valve func-
tion that the country-specific safeguard would perform. I round out my 
                                                                                                                           
 34. See infra Part I.  
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discussions of the country-specific safeguard by offering preemptive rebut-
tals to potential criticisms of the country-specific safeguard.35 
I further argue that once antidumping is replaced by the country-specific 
safeguard proposed in this Article, countervailing duties will become 
unnecessary, as the country-specific safeguard will have addressed injury 
from all sources, including injury caused by subsidies. Therefore, to round 
off the reform, I argue that countervailing duties should be eliminated as a 
separate option for disciplining the use of subsidies and should be subsumed 
under the country-specific safeguard. Direct limitations on the use of 
subsidies through the WTO, however, may be preserved. I argue that this 
reform proposal is consistent with previous scholarly proposals regarding 
countervailing duty laws.36  
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I examines the fun-
damental defects of antidumping and identifies the goals of antidumping 
reforms in light of those defects. Part II discusses the details of the proposed 
country-specific safeguard. Part III discusses how to fit countervailing duties 
within the framework of the proposed country-specific safeguard.  
I. The Fundamental Defects of Antidumping 
Before I proceed to examine the fundamental defects of antidumping, a 
discussion of how dumping is determined under antidumping laws is in or-
der. To use U.S. antidumping law as an example, dumping, or “sales at less 
than fair value,”37 is determined by a comparison of the sales price of an im-
ported product in the importing country with the normal value of the 
imported product.38 The normal value of an imported product is usually the 
price of the product sold in its home market.39 For the home-market price to 
be used as the basis of the price comparison, the home-market price must 
pass a “cost test”: it must not be below the cost of production of the prod-
uct.40 When the home-market price fails the cost test or when the product is 
not sold in its home market at all, the normal value of the product will be 
determined by the price of the product sold in a third country41 or by the 
constructed value42 of the product, equal to the cost of production of the 
                                                                                                                           
 35. See infra Part II.  
 36. See infra Part III. 
 37. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(34) (2011). 
 38. Id. § 1677b(a). 
 39. Id. § 1677b(a)(1)(B)(i).  
 40. Id. § 1677b(b)(1). The cost of production of a product is equal to the sum of (1) 
“the cost of materials and of fabrication or other processing of any kind employed in [produc-
tion]”; (2) “an amount for selling, general and administrative expenses”; and (3) “the cost of 
all containers and coverings and all other expenses incidental to placing the product in condi-
tion packed ready for shipment.” Id. § 1677b(b)(3). 
 41. Id. § 1677b(a)(1). 
 42. Id. § 1677b(a)(4), (e). 
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merchandise plus a reasonable allowance for general, selling, and adminis-
trative expenses and profits.43  
A. The Economic Critiques of Antidumping 
A large amount of scholarship, both in economics and in law, has cri-
tiqued antidumping from economic perspectives. The economic critiques of 
antidumping in the existing literature focus primarily on two issues: the lack 
of sound economic rationales for antidumping and the welfare cost of anti-
dumping. Since these critiques have been thoroughly laid out elsewhere, I 
will only provide a brief summary of them below. 
1. The Lack of Sound Economic Rationales for Antidumping 
A central economic critique of antidumping is that it lacks sound eco-
nomic rationales because dumping, as the term is defined under current 
antidumping laws, is indeed a reasonable business practice except under ex-
traordinary circumstances. As discussed above, antidumping liabilities 
primarily arise where a product is sold in a foreign market at a price lower 
than the price charged domestically, a practice that economists often refer to 
as international price discrimination.44 International price discrimination, 
however, is a rational, generally procompetitive response of a producer fac-
ing an overseas market with greater demand elasticity than his home 
market.45 Antidumping liabilities will also arise if a product is sold overseas 
below its cost of production, when the normal value of the product is deter-
mined by the constructed-value method.46 This method of ascertaining 
dumping, however, ignores firms’ cost structures, as it is economically ra-
tional for firms to sell below the full cost of production as long as the 
marginal revenue from the sale exceeds the marginal cost of production.47 
There are many circumstances under which sales below full costs of produc-
                                                                                                                           
 43. Id. § 1677b(e)(2)(B). 
 44. Alan V. Deardorff, Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law, in The Multi-
lateral Trading System: Analysis and Options for Change 135, 135–42 (Robert M. 
Stern ed., 1993); see also Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT—Law and International Eco-
nomic Organization 168 (1970) (discussing dumping as “price discrimination among 
national markets”); Jacob Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade 2–3 
(A.M. Kelley 1991) (1923) (defining “dumping” as “price-discrimination between national 
markets”); Barceló, supra note 25, at 500–16. 
 45. See Peter H. Lindert & Charles P. Kindleberger, International Economics 
164–65 (7th ed. 1982); see also Barceló, supra note 25, at 503–06; Winston W. Chang, Anti-
dumping, Countervailing, and Safeguard Measures, 1 GITAM Rev. Int’l Bus. 1, 8–9 (2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1736735; J.A. Ordover et al., 
Unfair International Trade Practices, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 323, 328 (1983). 
 46. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(4); see also EU Antidumping Regulation, supra note 7, art. 
2.3, 2009 O.J. (L 343) at 54. 
 47. See John B. Taylor & Akila Weerapara, Principles of Microeconomics 257–
59 (7th ed. 2012) (describing marginal cost, marginal revenue, and profit maximization); see 
also Bhala, supra note 11, at 14.  
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tion are rational and have no adverse economic consequences, including 
“market expansion” dumping, “cyclical” dumping, “state-trading” dumping, 
and “life-cycle” dumping in high-tech industries.48 The consensus among 
economists is that dumping is worthy of condemnation on economic effi-
ciency grounds only if it constitutes predatory pricing, that is, pricing aimed 
at driving competitors out of the marketplace by charging below-cost prices 
and then recouping the losses afterward by charging monopolistic prices.49 
However, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, predatory pricing schemes 
“are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”50 This statement appears 
to be well supported by empirical evidence.51 At the international level, 
predatory pricing schemes would seem to face greater challenges.52 In any 
event, current antidumping laws are not about predatory pricing, as no proof 
of predatory pricing is required for a finding of dumping.53 
The only serious defense of antidumping in response to these critiques 
is that antidumping targets not the act of dumping by individual firms, but 
policies of foreign governments that allow foreign firms to earn high profits 
in their home sanctuary market and thus make it possible for those firms to 
                                                                                                                           
 48. See, e.g., Robert D. Willig, Economic Effects of Antidumping Policy, in Brookings 
Trade Forum: 1998, at 57, 61–66 (Robert Z. Lawrence ed., 1998). 
 49. See Irwin, supra note 25, at 162 (“On economic grounds, the fact that a firm charg-
es different prices in different markets is neither unfair nor a problem unless it harms 
competition (such as through anticompetitive actions or predatory practices).”); Barceló, supra 
note 25, at 513 (“[T]he ‘unfair competition’ argument has validity only where anticompetitive 
or predatory dumping is involved.”).  
 50. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). For a 
discussion of predatory pricing in a comparative context, see D. Daniel Sokol, Competition 
Policy and Comparative Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2009 BYU L. 
Rev. 1713, 1773–1801 (2009). 
 51. James Bovard pointed out in 1991 that “[a]lthough the fear of predation permeates 
dumping laws and regulations, there [has been] no known case in the last century of any com-
pany dumping its products in a U.S. market, bankrupting American producers, and then 
driving up its prices and shafting American consumers for a long period.” James Bovard, The 
Fair Trade Fraud 157 (1991). A 1997 study by R.M. van Dijk on antidumping cases in 
Mexico found that predation by foreign exporters might have been feasible only in two out of 
seventy-two Mexican cases, while a 2002 study by Aradhna Aggarwal on antidumping cases 
in India found that predation by foreign exporters might have been feasible only in eight out of 
223 Indian cases. Gunnar Niels & Adriaan ten Kate, Antidumping Policy in Developing Coun-
tries: Safety Valve or Obstacle to Free Trade?, 22 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 618, 622 (2006). 
 52. Barceló, supra note 25, at 502; see also Gunnar Niels, What Is Antidumping Policy 
Really All About?, 14 J. Econ. Survs. 467, 476 (2000) (noting that several prominent scholars 
have dismissed the threat of predatory pricing in international markets). 
 53. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of Interna-
tional Trade 254–55 (2005); Alan O. Sykes, Comparative Advantage and the Normative 
Economics of International Trade Policy, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 49, 80–81 (1998). See generally 
Petros C. Mavroidis et al., The Law and Economics of Contingent Protection in 
the WTO 7–18 (2008) (discussing the diversity of rationales and evidentiary burdens for 
demonstrating dumping among different legal regimes). 
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dump in overseas markets.54 The type of dumping that results from a pro-
tected home market is often referred to as strategic dumping in the 
economic literature.55 From a legal point of view, this sanctuary market or 
strategic dumping argument is curious, as antidumping laws lack a mecha-
nism for determining whether dumping is related to market distortions.56 A 
sanctuary home market could certainly lead to dumping, but this does not 
necessarily mean that the presence of dumping indicates a sanctuary home 
market. Evidence of dumping on the part of individual firms, therefore, 
should not be taken as conclusive evidence that anticompetitive government 
policies, rather than other legitimate reasons, are behind the dumping.57 
Even if strategic dumping could be identified through antidumping investi-
gations, antidumping duties do not provide a solution to the sanctuary 
market problem.58 Furthermore, economists have empirically examined the 
occurrence of strategic dumping in several key industries and concluded that 
this practice was rare to begin with.59 
2. The Welfare Cost of Antidumping 
Another central economic critique of antidumping is based on the wel-
fare cost of antidumping. Economic theories suggest that the type of price 
discrimination underlying dumping often leads to increased overall output 
and thus increased overall welfare,60 although the exact impact of dumping 
on global welfare depends on the situation with which price discrimination 
is compared.61 The effect of dumping on the importing country as a whole, 
                                                                                                                           
 54. See Communication from the United States to the WTO Negotiating Group on 
Rules, Basic Concepts and Principles of the Trade Remedy Rules, ¶ 13, TN/RL/W/27 (Oct. 22, 
2002).  
 55. See, e.g., Mavroidis et al., supra note 53, at 17–18; Niels, supra note 52, at 475. 
 56. See Daniel Ikenson, Cato Inst., Protection Made to Order: Domestic In-
dustry’s Capture and Reconfiguration of U.S. Antidumping Policy 4 (Trade Policy 
Analysis No. 44, 2010), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/tpa/tpa-044.pdf; see also Ir-
win, supra note 25, at 164. 
 57. Ikenson, supra note 56, at 4; Irwin, supra note 25, at 164.  
 58. See Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 25, at 30 (“Antidumping is an inferior in-
strument to address foreign market closure as it does not deal directly with the source of the 
problem, i.e., the government policies which artificially segment markets, or allow this to oc-
cur.”); see also Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Antidumping and Market 
Disruption: The Incentive Effects of Antidumping Laws, in The Multilateral Trading 
System: Analysis and Options for Change, supra note 44, at 155, 163 (“[Antidumping] is 
an inferior instrument to remedy an unfair practice because it does not address the source of 
the problem, which, in the context of dumping, must be those policies that artificially segment 
markets.”). 
 59. See Patrick A. Messerlin, Competition Policy and Antidumping Reform: An Exer-
cise in Transition, in The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead 219, 224–25, 224 
tbl.2 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996).  
 60. See Niels, supra note 52, at 474. 
 61. Id.; see also H.R. Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 597, 619–24 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989). 
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however, is positive, as the gain to consumers outweighs the cost to im-
port-competing producers.62 One economist estimated that, based on eight 
antidumping duty orders in place in the United States from 1989 to 1990, 
“the minimum consumer cost per job created or saved by the antidumping 
orders was $113,800, while the minimum cost to the economy to create an 
additional job was $14,300.”63 The U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) estimated in 1991 that outstanding U.S. antidumping and counter-
vailing duty orders as of that year imposed a net welfare cost of $1.59 
billion on the U.S. economy.64 A 1999 study by three economists concluded 
that the net welfare cost of outstanding U.S. antidumping and countervailing 
duty orders was four billion dollars in 1993.65 
The lack of sound economic rationales, along with the net welfare cost 
of antidumping, have led many economists and legal scholars to conclude 
that antidumping is protectionist and unsupported by purported economic 
justifications.66 The most economically appealing way to reform 
antidumping, according to these scholars, is to abolish it altogether.67 
B. Antidumping As a Faulty Safety Valve 
The economic critiques of antidumping, however, speak only of the ex 
post effect of antidumping on trade. These critiques lay out the case that 
for any given amount of trade, antidumping has a negative effect on trade 
ex post. But the critiques do not take into account the ex ante benefit of 
                                                                                                                           
 62. See Niels, supra note 52, at 475; see also Deardorff, supra note 44, at 135.  
 63. Keith B. Anderson, Antidumping Laws in the United States: Use and Welfare Con-
sequences, J. World Trade, Apr. 1993, at 99, 115. 
 64. The Economic Effects of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders and Sus-
pension Agreements, Inv. No. 332–344, USITC Pub. 2900, at x (June 1995). 
 65. Michael P. Gallaway et al., Welfare Costs of the U.S. Antidumping and Countervail-
ing Duty Laws, 49 J. Int’l Econ. 211, 211 (1999).  
 66. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 309–11 (4th ed. 1992) (de-
scribing antidumping as protectionist); Barceló, supra note 25, at 519–24 (describing the 
protectionist character of antidumping); William J. Davey, Antidumping Laws in the GATT 
and the EC, in Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study 296–97 (John H. 
Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989) (noting that antidumping laws are not “justified 
economically”); J. Michael Finger, The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation, in 
Antidumping: How it Works and Who Gets Hurt, supra note 33, at 13, 34 (“Antidump-
ing is ordinary protection with a grand public relations program.”); Mankiw & Swagel, supra 
note 25, at 107 (“[Antidumping has become] little more than an excuse for special interests to 
shield themselves from competition at the expense of both American consumers and other 
American companies.”).  
 67. Finger, supra note 33, at 57 (“The most appealing option is to get rid of antidump-
ing laws and to put nothing in their place.”). Other scholars have espoused a similar opinion. 
See, e.g., Bovard, supra note 51, at 160 (“The U.S. should take the lead in the dismantling of 
antidumping laws.”); Charles K. Rowley et al., Trade Protection in the United 
States 268 (1995); Caine, supra note 33, at 724–26 (arguing that the antidumping provisions 
of the Tariff Act of 1930 should be repealed); Mankiw & Swagel, supra note 25, at 117 (“Out-
right repeal of U.S. antidumping laws would certainly be the best policy for the United States’ 
well-being . . . .”).  
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antidumping—the potential for antidumping to facilitate future trade liberal-
izations by serving as a “safety valve” for protectionist pressures. It is this 
safety-valve function that provides a potential justification for antidumping 
despite all its defects. 
Depending on the nature of the protectionist pressure for which the 
antidumping safety valve could be used, commentators have distinguished 
three variants of antidumping safety valves: the temporary-adjustment safety 
valve, the political-support safety valve, and the unfair-trade safety valve.68 
The temporary-adjustment safety valve refers to the function of antidumping 
in providing temporary import restrictions that will allow domestic 
industries of the importing country to adjust to import competition.69 The 
need for such a temporary-adjustment safety valve is usually discussed in 
the context of the global safeguard,70 but scholars have examined 
antidumping from the perspective of safeguards71 or argued that 
antidumping could function as a safeguard mechanism.72 The political-
support safety valve refers to the function of antidumping in helping 
politicians secure political support for trade liberalizations.73 Again, the 
political-support safety valve is often discussed in the context of the global 
safeguard,74 but it has been noted that the political logic of antidumping is 
akin to that of the global safeguard.75 Finally, the unfair-trade safety valve 
                                                                                                                           
 68. See Reem Anwar Ahmed Raslan, Antidumping: A Developing Country Per-
spective, at xvi (2009); see also Niels & ten Kate, supra note 51, at 624–25. 
 69. See Raslan, supra note 68, at xvi. 
 70. For example, a WTO dispute settlement panel once stated in a dispute concerning 
safeguards, 
If WTO law were not to offer a safety valve for situations in which, following trade 
liberalization, imports increase so as to cause serious injury or threat thereof to a 
domestic industry, Members could be deterred from entering into additional tariff 
concessions and from engaging in further trade liberalization. It is for this reason 
that the safeguard mechanism in Article XIX has always been an integral part of the 
GATT. 
Panel Report, United States—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen 
Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, ¶ 7.77, WT/DS177/R (Dec. 21, 2000).  
 71. See generally J. Michael Finger et al., Antidumping As Safeguard Policy (World 
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2730, 2001) (discussing the weaknesses of anti-
dumping as a safeguard mechanism). 
 72. See Raslan, supra note 68, at xvii (arguing that antidumping laws could be used as 
a safeguard that serves as a temporary-adjustment safety valve). 
 73. See id. at xvi. 
 74. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism As a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis 
of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991) 
(using public choice theory and the economics of contracting to explain WTO rules on safe-
guards). 
 75. Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Cases, 16 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 5, 22 (1996) (“The nature of the remedy in [anti]dumping 
and subsidies cases adds . . . support to the conjecture that antidumping and countervailing du-
ty law have a political logic akin to that of the escape clause.”). 
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refers to the function of antidumping in remedying unfair trade practices.76 
This argument apparently is a reincarnation of the argument that dumping 
constitutes an unfair trade practice, an argument that has been discredited as 
discussed above.77  
Anecdotal and empirical evidence provides support for the safety-valve 
theories, although the evidence is not conclusive. It has been widely noted 
that antidumping and trade liberalization go hand in hand. It has been 
observed, for example, that antidumping laws were first adopted in the 
United States as part of a package that included both tariff reductions and 
administered protection mechanisms.78 It has also been observed that “the 
number of countries with . . . antidumping laws is strongly correlated with 
the number of countries which are members of the GATT/WTO,”79 and that 
“[a]s free trade agreements have reduced tariffs and outlawed most import 
quotas, antidumping cases have increased dramatically.”80 This trend is 
borne out by the experience of individual countries. For example, some 
Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, became heavy 
antidumping users after they unilaterally reduced import tariffs.81 More 
rigorous empirical studies have also confirmed the correlation between 
antidumping and trade liberalization. One study found that countries 
engaging in larger tariff concessions during the Uruguay Round initiated 
relatively more antidumping cases in the years following the Uruguay 
                                                                                                                           
 76. Raslan, supra note 68, at xvi. This argument is on vivid display in a communica-
tion from the United States to the WTO in 1998: “[A]ntidumping laws administered in strict 
conformity with the Antidumping Agreement actually assist governments in their efforts to 
continue trade-liberalizing measures by providing relief to domestic industries injured by for-
eign firms that engage in unfair trade practices, even as international trade liberalizes.” 
Communication from the United States to the WTO Working Group on the Interaction Be-
tween Trade and Competition Policy, Observations on the Distinctions Between Competition 
Laws and Antidumping Rules, at 3, WT/WGTCP/W/88 (Aug. 28, 1998). 
 77. See supra Part I.A. 
 78. See Douglas Nelson, The Political Economy of Antidumping: A Survey, 22 Eur. J. 
Pol. Econ. 554, 573 (2006) (“[I]t was only with the adoption of the Reciprocal Trade Agree-
ments Act . . . of 1934 that antidumping became part of a system explicitly linking administered 
protection to liberalization.”).  
 79. Zanardi, supra note 17, at 410.  
 80. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law As a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 
67 Antitrust L.J. 725, 734 (2000).  
 81. See Honorio Kume & Guida Piani, Antidumping and Safeguard Mechanisms: The 
Brazilian Experience, 1988–2003, in Safeguards & Antidumping in Latin American 
Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire 79, 79–89 (J. Michael Finger & Julio J. 
Nogués eds., 2006) (“Together with a gradual import liberalization process, Brazil began im-
plementing trade defense instruments to provide temporary relief to certain sectors when they 
were affected by foreign competition.”); Julio J. Nogués & Elias Baracat, Political Economy of 
Antidumping and Safeguards in Argentina, in Safeguards & Antidumping in Latin Ameri-
can Trade Liberalization: Fighting Fire with Fire, supra, at 45, 45–48 (“[A]fter 
implementing trade liberalization policies in the early 1990s, Argentina initiated a record 
number of antidumping investigations.”).  
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Round.82 Another study found that among a small set of developing 
countries that are heavy users of antidumping, an increase of one standard 
deviation in sectoral liberalization “increase[s] the probability of observing 
an antidumping filing” by about twenty-five percent.83 To be sure, a 
correlation between antidumping and trade liberalization does not 
necessarily mean that the former causes the latter, or that the former is a 
necessary condition for the latter.84 Nor does it necessarily mean that the net 
impact of antidumping and trade liberalization on welfare will be positive.85 
But anecdotal evidence does indicate that the ability to impose antidumping 
duties served as a quid pro quo for trade liberalization in negotiations over 
some of the most significant trade liberalization deals so far. For example, it 
has been observed that “exceptions for trade remedies” were included in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 “in part because 
some countries (the United States . . . in particular) would not otherwise 
have agreed to other aspects of [the] liberalization mandated by that 
agreement.”86 There are also indications that the use of antidumping by 
Mexico since the mid-1980s “allow[ed] the Mexican government to push 
through its trade liberalization agenda from the mid-1980s onwards, 
                                                                                                                           
 82. See Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, Tariff Liberalization and Increased 
Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?, 30 World Econ. 948, 960 (2007).  
 83. Michael O. Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is 
There a Substitution Effect?, 15 Rev. Dev. Econ. 601, 616–17 (2011) (examining the deter-
minants of antidumping filings).  
 84. Niels & ten Kate, supra note 51, at 627 (“[I]t is worth noting that the apparent posi-
tive correlation between trade liberalisation (or WTO/GATT memberships) on the one hand, 
and [antidumping] laws and usage, on the other, says little about the causal relationship be-
tween the two.”). One empirical study shows that there is no evidence that past antidumping 
actions are positively correlated with later reductions in tariff barriers in a sample of twenty-
three developing countries. Michael O. Moore & Maurizio Zanardi, Does Antidumping Use 
Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries?, 42 Can. J. Econ. 469, 469 
(2009).  
 85. Some commentators have suggested that antidumping may have a net positive ef-
fect on welfare. See Simon P. Anderson & Nicolas Schmitt, Nontariff Barriers and Trade 
Liberalization, 41 Econ. Inquiry 80, 95 (2003) (suggesting that “tariff liberalization [is] as-
sociated with an overall trade expansion despite the endogenous emergence of [nontariff 
barriers]” such as quotas and antidumping measures); Jorge Miranda et al., The International 
Use of Antidumping: 1987–1997, J. World Trade, Oct. 1998, at 5, 60 (suggesting that there 
may be welfare gains from antidumping if it is a quid pro quo for general trade liberalization).  
 86. Tania Voon, Eliminating Trade Remedies from the WTO: Lessons from Regional 
Trade Agreements, 59 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 625, 629 (2010); see also Dam, supra note 44, at 
99, 107 (“[The escape clause’s] justification is that the presence of such a clause encourages 
cautious countries to enter into a greater number of tariff bindings than would otherwise be the 
case.”); Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 53, at 312–13 (“[T]he clause, in addition to being a 
prerequisite for essential U.S. participation, encouraged trade liberalization more generally.”); 
World Trade Report 2009, supra note 13, at 26–30, 39 (“[T]he reason for introducing con-
tingency measures . . . is . . . to allow governments to address future developments that are 
unpredictable . . . .”).  
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culminating in the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).”87 
As seen from the above discussions, the safety-valve theories defend an-
tidumping on a different level than the economic critiques criticize it. The 
safety-valve theories implicitly concede that the “unfair trade” rhetoric of 
antidumping should not be taken at face value. According to proponents of 
the safety-valve theories, the real focus of antidumping is not “fair” or “un-
fair” trade, but “acceptable vs. unacceptable levels of trade.”88 In other 
words, when the real utility of antidumping lies with its function as a safety 
valve, the question of fair or unfair trade becomes irrelevant. This contrasts 
with the approach taken by the critics of antidumping, who have basically 
taken the economic rationales for antidumping at their face value.89 In this 
sense, the two sides in the antidumping debate have never engaged each 
other; the stalemate over antidumping will continue unless they do. 
I argue in this Article that one way for the two sides in the antidumping 
debate to engage each other is for opponents of antidumping to step back 
and acknowledge the potential value of antidumping as a safety valve, and 
for supporters of antidumping to step back and acknowledge that antidump-
ing may not be the best safety valve available. Proceeding with this line of 
analysis, I demonstrate below that antidumping is a faulty safety valve: one 
that provides arbitrary levels of protection for petitioners, results in unnec-
essary uncertainties for respondents, and has too low a threshold for 
activation. Identifying antidumping’s defects is the first step toward reform-
ing antidumping in a manner that makes it a better safety valve.  
1. Arbitrary Levels of Protection for Petitioners 
The first defect of antidumping as a safety valve is that the level of 
protection it provides for domestic industries is arbitrary. The reasons for 
this conclusion are twofold. First, as summarized above, dumping is not 
inherently wrong from an economic perspective.90 The amount of the 
antidumping duties imposed to counter dumping, therefore, is also 
meaningless from an economic perspective.91 Second, the level of protection 
provided by antidumping is arbitrary because it is dictated by something 
that is only tangentially related to the extent of injury to domestic industries. 
As summarized above, antidumping is based on the notion that 
international price discrimination or below-cost pricing constitutes unfair 
trade. Consequently, the amount of antidumping duties is determined by 
                                                                                                                           
 87. Niels & ten Kate, supra note 51, at 626 & n.31.  
 88. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Fair or Unfair Trade: Does it Matter?, 13 Cornell Int’l 
L.J. 205, 218–19 (1980); see also Finger, supra note 33, at 59.  
 89. See supra Part I.A (discussing critiques of antidumping). 
 90. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.  
 91. For the same reason, it has been argued that the question of fair or unfair trade is 
not the real focus of antidumping. See supra notes 28, 88 and accompanying text.  
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the so-called margin of dumping,92 defined as the difference between the 
export price of the product under investigation and its normal value.93 The 
dumping margin, however, is not a precise gauge of the extent of injury to 
domestic industries. This is implicitly recognized by the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement, which recommends that WTO members set the amount of 
antidumping duties at an amount “less than the [dumping margin] if such 
lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the domestic 
industry.”94 The European Union, a jurisdiction that has implemented this 
lesser duty rule, explicitly requires the injury margin, or the amount of 
duties that would be adequate to remove injury, to be based on the 
underselling margin, that is, the margin by which an imported product 
undersells the domestic like product.95 It appears that if the goal of 
antidumping is to remove injury to domestic industries, the level of 
protection domestic industries are entitled to should be no more than the 
underselling margin. But in order to obtain import protection through 
antidumping, domestic industries have to jump through the legal hoop that 
requires the calculation of the dumping margin. To be sure, the dumping 
margin and the underselling margin are not entirely uncorrelated: the more 
an imported product is “dumped,” the more likely it will undersell the 
domestic like product of the importing country. But in general, it will only 
be a coincidence if the dumping margin exactly matches the underselling 
margin. Therefore, except under rare circumstances, basing the amount of 
antidumping duties on the dumping margin will lead to either higher or 
lower duties than are necessary to remove injury to domestic industries.  
To illustrate the second reason why antidumping provides arbitrary lev-
els of protection for petitioners, consider the hypothetical scenario shown in 
Table A below. Suppose there are two respondents whose products are under 
antidumping investigation. Respondent A sells its product, Product A, for 
                                                                                                                           
 92. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994 art. 9.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter WTO Antidumping Agree-
ment].  
 93. Id. art. 2.1–2.  
 94. Id. art. 9.1.  
 95. EU antidumping rules provide that “[t]he amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not 
exceed the margin of dumping established but it should be less than the margin if such lesser 
duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Community industry.” EU Antidumping 
Regulation, supra note 7, art. 9.4, 2009 O.J. (L 343) at 62. The European Commission calcu-
lates the injury margin by comparing the difference between the export price of the product 
under investigation and the actual selling price of the EU product (referred to as “price under-
cutting”), or the difference between the export price of the product under investigation and the 
target price of the EU product, namely, the fictitious price at which EU producers could sell 
their product in the absence of dumped imports (referred to as “price underselling”). Yan 
Luo, Anti-dumping in the WTO, the EU, and China: The Rise of Legalization in the 
Trade Regime and Its Consequences 130–32 (2010). The term underselling used in this 
Article encompasses both the term undercutting and the term underselling currently used in 
EU antidumping law.  
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$90 in the importing country and for $95 in its home country, resulting in a 
dumping margin of $5 ($95–$90). Respondent B sells its product, Product 
B, for $95 in the importing country and for $105 in its home country, result-
ing in a dumping margin of $10 ($105–$95). The domestic like product of 
the importing country is sold for $100. The underselling margins for Prod-
uct A and Product B, therefore, are $10 ($100–$90) and $5 ($100–$95), 
respectively. Because Product A undersells the domestic like product more 
than Product B does, the petitioner will want to keep Product A out of the 
market more than it wants to keep Product B out of the market. It happens, 
however, that the dumping margin for Product A ($5) is lower than the un-
derselling margin ($10), while the dumping margin for Product B ($10) is 
higher than the underselling margin ($5). Basing the amount of antidumping 
duties on the dumping margin will lead to a mismatch between the level of 
protection provided under antidumping and the level of protection the peti-
tioner needs. In this hypothetical scenario, the petitioner will receive a 
higher level of protection against a respondent that poses less of a threat to it 
(that is, Respondent B), and a lower level of protection against a respondent 
that poses more of a threat to it (that is, Respondent A). 
Table A 
The Mismatch Between the Dumping Margin 
and the Underselling Margin 
 
Export 
Price 
Home-
Market 
Price 
Dumping 
Margin 
Price of 
Domestic 
Like Product
Underselling 
Margin 
Product A 90 95 5 100 10
Product B 95 105 10 100 5
 
The arbitrariness of the levels of protection antidumping provides for 
petitioners means that, contrary to conventional wisdom, petitioners are not 
the almost-guaranteed winner under antidumping. Antidumping proceedings 
have a very high probability of resulting in positive findings of dumping. 
Between 1990 and 2000, for example, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
issued only three negative dumping determinations out of a total of nearly 
four hundred cases.96 What really matters to petitioners, however, is not just 
that an antidumping proceeding results in a positive finding of dumping, but 
more importantly that an antidumping proceeding results in high antidump-
ing duty rates against the most competitive foreign producers, that is, 
foreign producers that sell at the lowest prices. Under the current antidump-
ing regime, however, petitioners can achieve the latter only by chance, 
because, as illustrated in Table A above, the foreign producers that sell at the 
lowest prices do not necessarily have the highest dumping margins. 
                                                                                                                           
 96. Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, Antidumping 5, 22–23 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8398, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w8398.pdf. 
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The results of a recent antidumping investigation, reproduced in Table B 
below, provide a perfect example of this disadvantage of antidumping for 
petitioners. In this antidumping investigation, concerning multilayered wood 
flooring from China, the highest antidumping duty rate was 58.84%, appli-
cable to all producers from China that were not receiving an individualized 
antidumping duty rate. The three largest exporters (by volume) of the sub-
ject merchandise, shown in the top three rows in Table B,97 received an 
antidumping duty rate of 3.98%, 2.63%, and 0%, respectively. This anti-
dumping case will by all means be included in the official statistics as one in 
which the petitioners were successful in petitioning for antidumping protec-
tion, but the level of protection the petitioners obtained in this case was little 
more than symbolic. After incurring all of the expenses associated with an 
antidumping proceeding,98 the petitioners were able to impose only negligi-
ble or even zero amounts of antidumping duties on products of the three 
largest exporters from China, exporters that presumably posed the greatest 
threat to the petitioners. The reason for this, again, is that the dumping mar-
gin of a foreign producer is not a reliable indicator of the foreign producer’s 
threat to domestic industries. 
Table B 
Antidumping Duty Rates in Multilayered Wood 
Flooring from the People’s Republic of China: 
Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value99 
Exporter/Producer 
Weighted Average 
Margin 
Zhejiang Layo Wood Industry Co., Ltd. 3.98
The Samling Group 2.63
Zhejiang Yuhua Timber Co., Ltd. 0
74 Separate-Rate Producers 3.31
PRC-Wide Entity 58.84
 
                                                                                                                           
 97. The U.S. Department of Commerce selected the three largest Chinese exporters (by 
volume) of the subject merchandise as the mandatory respondents pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677f–1(c)(2)(B) (2011). Multilayered Wood Flooring from the People’s Republic of China, 
76 Fed. Reg. 30,656, 30,658 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011) (prelim. determination).  
 98. The costs of filing an antidumping petition, including the costs for legal counsel, 
consultants, and lost management time in the gathering and analysis of information, were es-
timated to be between one hundred and fifty thousand and five hundred thousand dollars in 
1988, and that number would likely be at least three times as high today. Jeffrey L. Kessler 
& Spencer Weber Waller, International Trade and U.S. Antitrust Law § 14:2 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
 99. Multilayered Wood Flooring from the People’s Republic of China, 76 Fed. Reg. 
64,318, 64,323–24 (Dep’t of Commerce Oct. 18, 2011) (final determination).  
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2. Unnecessary Uncertainties for Respondents  
The second defect of antidumping as a safety valve is that antidumping 
duties are overly unpredictable and result in unnecessary uncertainties for 
respondents. As I will detail below, the root cause of the unpredictability of 
antidumping duties is, once again, the requirement that the amount of anti-
dumping duties be determined by the dumping margin.  
Basing the amount of antidumping duties on the dumping margin makes 
antidumping duties overly unpredictable because the dumping margin itself 
is overly unpredictable. To calculate the dumping margin for a producer, a 
large amount of pricing and cost information is needed. In antidumping pro-
ceedings in the United States, for example, the pricing and cost information 
necessary for the calculation of a product’s normal value and export price or 
constructed export price—values required to determine the dumping mar-
gin100—include, among others, the price of the foreign like product in the 
exporting country or a third country,101 the cost of production of the produc-
er,102 packing and moving expenses,103 import and export duties and 
countervailing duties,104 commissions and selling expenses for selling the 
product in the importing country,105 adjustments for different quantities of 
sale,106 adjustments for different physical characteristics of the foreign like 
product,107 adjustments for different circumstances of sale,108 and adjust-
ments for different levels of trade.109 These prices and costs fluctuate on a 
regular basis and are not easily predictable. For producers whose products 
are subject to an antidumping investigation but whose dumping margins are 
                                                                                                                           
 100. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(35)(A) (2011); see id. § 1677a(a), (b) (defining the terms “export 
price” and “constructed export price,” respectively).  
 101. Id. § 1677b(a)(1) (explaining that the price of the foreign like product in the export-
ing country or a third country is necessary to determine normal value).  
 102. In the United States, the producer’s cost of production is needed both to determine 
whether to disregard a sales price for the foreign like product in the determination of normal 
value, id. § 1677b(b), and for the purpose of determining whether to use the constructed value 
of the imported merchandise as the normal value, id.; see id. § 1677b(e) (defining the term 
“constructed value”). 
 103. In the United States, these costs and expenses need to be adjusted to determine ex-
port price and constructed export price, id. § 1677a(c), and to determine the price of the 
foreign like product in the exporting country or a third country, id. § 1677b(a)(6). 
 104. These duties need to be adjusted to determine export price and constructed export 
price. Id. § 1677a(c). 
 105. These expenses need to be adjusted to determine constructed export price. Id. 
§ 1677a(d).  
 106. These adjustments need to be made to determine the price of the foreign like prod-
uct. Id. § 1677b(a)(6)(C)(i).  
 107. These adjustments need to be made to determine the price of the foreign like prod-
uct. Id. § 1677b(a)(6)(C)(ii); see also id. § 1677(16)(B), (C). 
 108. These adjustments need to be made to determine the price of the foreign like prod-
uct. Id. § 1677b(a)(6)(C)(iii). 
 109. These adjustments need to be made to determine the price of the foreign like prod-
uct. Id. § 1677b(a)(7). 
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not individually assessed,110 the task of predicting or estimating their anti-
dumping liabilities is even more challenging, as their dumping margins 
depend not on their own prices and costs, but on the prices and costs of oth-
er producers.111  
Antidumping duties are particularly unpredictable when they are as-
sessed on a retrospective basis. The WTO Antidumping Agreement allows 
two ways of assessing antidumping duties: retrospective and prospective.112 
The United States currently employs a retrospective assessment system, 
wherein the dumping margin found in an antidumping investigation only de-
termines the amount of cash deposits collected to cover antidumping 
liabilities for future entries of imports;113 the final antidumping duties for 
such imports are not assessed until an administrative review is conducted to 
determine the actual amount of antidumping duties for the review period.114 
To be sure, this retrospective system is faithful to the notion that the amount 
of antidumping duties is determined by the dumping margin because, by 
definition, the dumping margin for a particular entry of imports can be de-
termined only after the entry is made and all of the information that is 
necessary for the calculation of the dumping margin becomes available. But 
precisely because of its retrospective nature, this system of assessing anti-
dumping duties leads to a great deal of unpredictability for the parties 
involved in the importation process. At the time of making an entry of im-
ports, importers and foreign producers have no way of knowing the actual 
amount of antidumping duties they will owe on the entry; they will not have 
that information for months or even years after a purchasing decision has to 
be made.115 
                                                                                                                           
 110. U.S. antidumping law generally requires the antidumping administering authority to 
individually determine the dumping margin for each known exporter and producer of the 
subject merchandise in an antidumping investigation. Id. § 1677f–1(c)(1). However, when “it 
is not practicable to make individual dumping margin determinations . . . because of the large 
number of exporters and producers involved in the investigation,” U.S. antidumping law 
allows the antidumping administering authority to selectively examine a limited number of 
exporters and producers. Id. § 1677f–1(c)(2). 
 111. The dumping margins for the exporters and producers not individually investigated 
will generally be determined by the “all-others rate,” id. § 1673(c)(1)(B)(i), which is the 
weighted average of the dumping margins established for exporters and producers individually 
investigated, id. § 1673d(c)(5)(A). 
 112. See WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 9.3.1–.2. 
 113. In the United States, the collection of cash deposits begins on the finding of an 
affirmative preliminary determination of dumping. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d)(1)(B) (2011). 
Cash deposits will continue to be collected for future entries of imports if an affirmative fi-
nal determination of dumping is made and a final antidumping order is issued. Id. 
§ 1673d(c)(1)(B)(ii).  
 114. Id. § 1675(a)(1), (2)(c). 
 115. In 2010, the U.S. Department of Commerce, at the request of the U.S. Congress, 
solicited public comments on the relative advantages and disadvantages of retrospective versus 
prospective antidumping and countervailing duty systems. Report to Congress: Retrospective 
Versus Prospective Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Systems; Request for Comment and 
Notice of a Public Hearing, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,079 (Mar. 31, 2010). Among the comments sub-
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The unpredictability of antidumping duties is somewhat reduced, but 
not entirely eliminated, by having a prospective system of assessing 
antidumping duties, which is employed by essentially all WTO members 
other than the United States.116 Under a prospective system of assessing 
antidumping duties, the dumping margin calculated in an antidumping 
investigation determines the final amount of antidumping duties that will be 
assessed for future entries of imports, unless and until a new “changed 
circumstance” or “interim” review changes the final amount of antidumping 
duties going forward.117 A prospective system of assessing antidumping 
duties allows the parties involved in the importation process to know exactly 
what their antidumping liabilities will be for a particular entry of imports at 
the time of the entry, thereby affording them the certainty they need to make 
purchasing decisions.118 A prospective system, however, can only provide 
predictability in the short term. Since under a prospective system the 
amount of antidumping duties is still pegged to the dumping margin and the 
dumping margin could be updated by future reviews, the final amount of 
antidumping duties importers will owe on imports could change any time a 
new review is conducted.119 Under a prospective system, therefore, 
                                                                                                                           
mitted by U.S. importers and foreign producers, one of the most complained-about aspects of 
the retrospective system was its unpredictability for importers and foreign producers. See, e.g., 
Letter from Kevin M. Burke, President & CEO, Am. Apparel & Footwear Ass’n, to Ronald K. 
Lorentzen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Commerce for Imp. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 
(Apr. 20, 2010), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/rvp/cmts-20100420/aafa-rvp-cmt-
20100420.pdf (“The uncertainty generated by the current U.S. system for the collection of an-
tidumping and countervailing duties is a matter of great concern to our members.”); Letter 
from Robert J. McHale, Dir. of Metal Purchases, Alcoa Inc., to Ronald K. Lorentzen, Deputy 
Assistant Sec’y of Commerce for Imp. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Apr. 20, 2010), 
available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/rvp/cmts-20100420/alcoa-rvp-cmt-20100420.pdf 
(calling the U.S. system an “untenable situation” because of the uncertainty and fear it cre-
ates). For all of the public comments on this subject matter, see Relative Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Retrospective Versus Prospective Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Systems: Public Comments Received April 20, 2010, U.S. Import Admin., http:// 
ia.ita.doc.gov/download/rvp/cmts-20100420/rvp-cmt-20100420-index.html (last updated Dec. 
3, 2010).  
 116. Int’l Trade Admin., Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Retro-
spective and Prospective Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Collection 
Systems: Report to Congress 10 (2010), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/download/ 
rvp/rvp-final-report-to-congress-20101119.pdf. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Technically, importers and foreign producers only face predictability as to the ceil-
ing of their antidumping liabilities. The WTO Antidumping Agreement requires member 
countries that operate a prospective system of assessing antidumping duties to provide a 
prompt refund if the importer requests a refund review and if the refund review demonstrates 
that the amount of antidumping duties assessed at the time of the entry exceeded the actual 
dumping margin. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 9.3.2; Int’l Trade Ad-
min., supra note 116, at 11. Under a prospective system, therefore, importers could have their 
antidumping duties reduced retrospectively through a refund review. But even this partial pre-
dictability helps importers and foreign producers make sound purchasing decisions.  
 119. The periodic updating of antidumping duties is explicitly permitted under Article 11.2 
of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 11.2. 
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importers are able to know their antidumping liabilities for the immediate 
short term but are not able to know their antidumping liabilities for the 
medium and long terms.  
The unpredictability of antidumping duties results in unnecessary un-
certainties for respondents in antidumping proceedings and anyone that 
conducts business with them. Once a foreign producer is subject to an anti-
dumping investigation or has been found guilty of dumping, importers will 
hesitate to do business with that producer because the antidumping liability 
could increase and shift to them with little warning or due process.120 The 
lack of long-term predictability will also hinder respondents’ ability to con-
duct long-term business planning and make long-term business 
commitments.121 These uncertainties are completely unnecessary for the 
goals of trade remedies. To protect domestic industries from import compe-
tition, additional tariffs in the form of fixed antidumping duties should be 
sufficient, provided that the antidumping duties are set at a large-enough 
level to remove injury to domestic industries. 
3. Low Threshold for Activation 
The third defect of antidumping as a safety valve is that it has too low a 
threshold for activation. Under antidumping laws, antidumping duties can 
be imposed only if the dumped imports cause or threaten to cause “material 
injury” to a domestic industry or cause “material retardation” of the estab-
lishment of such an industry.122 But as discussed below, this material-injury 
standard is too low and results in too many false positives in antidumping 
proceedings. 
Current international trade rules embody a low injury standard for anti-
dumping. The GATT 1947, the first international agreement to set forth a 
material-injury standard for antidumping, did not define what constitutes 
material injury.123 The 1967 Antidumping Code,124 negotiated in the GATT 
Kennedy Round to implement the antidumping provisions of the GATT 
1947, set a high standard for determining injury in antidumping investiga-
tions by requiring that dumped imports be “demonstrably the principal 
                                                                                                                           
 120. See Bovard, supra note 51, at 146–48. 
 121. See Administration of the Antidumping Act of 1921: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 95th Cong. 188–91 (1978) (statement of Am. 
Imps. Ass’n, Inc.) (arguing that contingent antidumping liabilities adversely affect long-term 
business relationships). 
 122. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI:6, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994] (set-
ting forth the injury requirement for the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties); 
e.g., WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 3 n.9 (defining the term “injury”). 
 123. Mitsuo Matsushita et al., The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice, 
and Policy 418 (2d ed. 2006). 
 124. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, done June 30, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 4348, 651 U.N.T.S. 320, reprinted in 32 Fed. Reg. 
14,962 (Oct. 28, 1967).  
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cause” of material injury.125 It also required antidumping authorities to 
weigh the effect of the dumping against all other factors that, taken together, 
may have been adversely affecting the industry in question.126 However, by 
the time the 1967 Antidumping Code was superseded by the 1979 Anti-
dumping Code127 as a result of the GATT Tokyo Round negotiations, the 
“principal cause” requirement and the requirement that the effect of dump-
ing be weighed against other factors were removed.128 The 1979 
Antidumping Code only required that dumped imports “cause” the injury 
and that injuries caused by other factors not be attributed to the dumped im-
ports.129 The subsequent WTO Antidumping Agreement, signed in 1994, 
adopted this relaxed injury standard almost verbatim.130  
Consistent with international antidumping rules, national antidumping 
laws currently require a low injury standard as well. Under U.S. 
antidumping law, for example, material injury is defined as harm that “is not 
inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant.”131 This tautological definition 
is supplemented with a list of statutory factors that should be considered in 
making material-injury determinations,132 but the statute provides no 
guidance on how severe the injury has to be before it can be considered 
material. The statute also requires the material injury to be “by reason of” 
imports or sales of the subject merchandise.133 Under the case law, however, 
the “by reason of” standard only requires a finding that imports of the 
subject merchandise are a cause of the injury, not that they are a primary or 
substantial cause of the injury.134 
                                                                                                                           
 125. Id. art. 3(a). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade art. 16(5), done Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4919, 1186 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter 1979 
Antidumping Code]. 
 128. See id. art. 3. These requirements were removed as a concession in exchange for the 
United States’ agreement to adopt a material-injury test in countervailing duty investigations. 
Peter D. Staple, Note, Implementing “Tokyo Round” Commitments: The New Injury Standard 
in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 32 Stan. L. Rev. 1183, 1192–94 (1980).  
 129. 1979 Antidumping Code, supra note 127, art. 3(4). 
 130. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 3.5. 
 131. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (2011).  
 132. The factors that should be considered in making material-injury determinations in-
clude 
the volume of imports of the subject merchandise, the effect of imports of that mer-
chandise on prices in the United States for domestic like products, . . . the impact of 
imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of domestic like products . . . 
[and] such other economic factors as are relevant to the determination regarding 
whether there is material injury by reason of imports. 
Id. § 1677(7)(B). 
 133. See id. § 1673. 
 134. See Bhala, supra note 11, at 51–52; Cho, supra note 25, at 379.  
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Many commentators have criticized the low injury standard in anti-
dumping proceedings as evidence of the protectionist nature of 
antidumping.135 But those criticisms do not respond to the safety-valve theo-
ries of antidumping because, according to those theories, antidumping is 
useful precisely because of its ability to provide protection. A more appro-
priate criticism of the low injury standard in antidumping proceedings is not 
that it results in protection, but that it results in protection where protection 
is not warranted. Under antidumping laws, firms whose injury is not primar-
ily or substantially caused by imports may still be able to successfully 
petition for antidumping duties as long as they can demonstrate that imports 
somewhat contributed to the injury. This injury standard is too low to ensure 
that only firms that are sufficiently injured by imports will obtain antidump-
ing protection. 
C. Antidumping and the Democracy Deficit 
Besides being a faulty safety valve, antidumping faces another funda-
mental problem: it reduces trade remedies to numerical formulas that 
deprive the trade remedy process of the democratic participation that is es-
sential for seeking consensus and compromises among vying interest 
groups. As discussed below, this democracy deficit in antidumping hinders 
the process by which societal preferences on trade protectionism are formed 
and has implications for the broader trade agenda. 
While the word democracy has many connotations, the element of de-
mocracy that is most applicable to international relations is participatory 
democracy, that is, “the democratic right of citizens to have knowledge of 
and participate in decisions that will affect their interests.”136 A lack of par-
ticipatory democracy is of particular concern to trade policy as “trade policy 
is more subject to capture by special interest groups than is ordinary law-
making.”137 
Many scholars have criticized the democracy deficit in trade policy, 
broadly defined.138 Many of the institutions established under international 
                                                                                                                           
 135. See, e.g., Barceló, supra note 25, at 513–17 (arguing that an injury test based on in-
jury to competitors is invalid and such a test, even with a substantial-injury requirement, 
contains strong elements of protectionist bias); Cho, supra note 25, at 377–80 (arguing that 
the injury test in antidumping cases protects competitors rather than competition itself and 
makes it easier for antidumping authorities to find injuries even when such injuries do not ex-
ist). 
 136. Robert F. Housman, Democratizing International Trade Decision-Making, 27 Cor-
nell Int’l L.J. 699, 702–03 (1994) (defining the word democracy in the context of 
international trade decision making).  
 137. See Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 451, 459 
(2001).  
 138. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT (1994) (discussing the tension 
between trade and the environment and laying out a framework for greater accommodation of 
environmentalist goals under the GATT); Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Devel-
opment of United States Trade Policy, 27 Cornell Int’l L.J. 631 (1994) (advocating the 
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trade agreements, such as the GATT, the WTO, and the NAFTA, to name 
just a few, have been criticized as lacking an avenue for public participation 
in the formulation of their rules or in their activities.139 
What is missing from the scholarly discourse on the democracy deficit 
in trade policy, however, is discussions of the democracy deficit in trade 
remedy instruments like antidumping. As in the case of the formulation of 
trade rules under international trade agreements, the determination of anti-
dumping duty rates affects a diverse range of domestic interests in the 
importing country: domestic manufacturers of products competing with the 
imports subject to antidumping investigation will favor the imposition of an-
tidumping duties, while importers, consumers, and downstream users of the 
imports will oppose it.140 The decision to impose antidumping duties will re-
sult in tradeoffs among these interests, and the amount of antidumping 
duties will determine the extent of the tradeoffs. If antidumping is nothing 
more than “ordinary protection,” as the economic critiques of antidumping 
have established,141 and if democratic principles are to apply to antidumping 
proceedings, the logical conclusion is that all of the parties whose interests 
are affected by the imposition of antidumping duties should have a say in 
the determination of antidumping duties.142  
                                                                                                                           
formulation of U.S. trade policies in accordance with democratic principles applicable to do-
mestic environmental, health, and safety policies); Housman, supra note 136 (criticizing the 
undemocratic nature of international trade decision making); Mark Ritchie, Democratizing the 
Trade Policy-Making Process: The Lessons of NAFTA and Their Implications for the GATT, 
27 Cornell Int’l L.J. 749 (1994) (criticizing the lack of democratic participation in the 
drafting of the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]); Andrea K. Schneider, De-
mocracy and Dispute Resolution: Individual Rights in International Trade Organizations, 19 
U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 587 (1998) (criticizing the lack of individual participation in the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms of international trade organizations); Paul Stephan, 
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw. J. Int’l 
L. & Bus. 681 (1996) (arguing that international lawmaking raises distinctive problems of ac-
countability that affect international law’s legitimacy); see also Atik, supra note 137, at 454–
55 (criticizing the democracy deficit in the WTO). 
 139. See Atik, supra note 137, at 454–63 (criticizing the lack of democracy in the WTO); 
Housman, supra note 136, at 703–15, 721–27 (criticizing the lack of democracy under the 
GATT and the NAFTA); Ritchie, supra note 138, at 749–51 (criticizing the lack of public par-
ticipation in the negotiations of the NAFTA and the GATT). 
 140. That consumers and downstream users are adversely affected by the imposition of 
antidumping duties can be illustrated by the large number of comments submitted by parties 
belonging to those two groups in response to the Department of Commerce’s solicitation of 
public comments on the relative advantages and disadvantages of retrospective versus pro-
spective antidumping and countervailing duty systems. See supra note 115.  
 141. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.  
 142. J. Michael Finger, Francis Ng, and Sonam Wangchuk have made a similar argu-
ment. They contend that antidumping serves the function of a safeguard, and that “the key 
characteristic of a sensible safeguard procedure is that it treats domestic interests that would 
be harmed by an import restriction equally with those domestic interests that would benefit.” 
Finger et al., supra note 71, at 10. They further argue that “[t]he ‘morality’ of the foreign in-
terest is irrelevant—the issue is the plus and minus on the domestic economy.” Id. 
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However, antidumping as it is currently formulated prevents meaningful 
participation by all stakeholders in antidumping proceedings. Aside from 
procedural and institutional idiosyncrasies that have been known to favor 
petitioners,143 one particular aspect of antidumping poses the ultimate hurdle 
to democratic participation. That aspect is none other than the dumping-
margin requirement, that is, the requirement that the amount of antidumping 
duties be tied to the dumping margin.  
The dumping-margin requirement leads to democracy deficit in 
antidumping proceedings primarily for two reasons. First, the requirement 
that the amount of antidumping duties be tied to the dumping margin turns 
antidumping into a mechanical number-crunching process that is devoid of 
the rich political and socioeconomic contexts in which trade policy usually 
operates.144 Under the dumping-margin requirement, the only thing that 
matters for antidumping purposes is how the numbers stack up: the amount 
of antidumping duties is dictated by the difference between the export price 
and the normal value, with complex formulas governing the calculation of 
both.145 To be sure, the WTO Antidumping Agreement only mandates that 
the amount of antidumping duties not exceed the dumping margin.146 But 
with the whole idea of antidumping centered on the notion that the dumping 
margin provides a quantifiable measure of the extent of “unfair trade,” 
basing the final amount of antidumping duties on anything other than the 
dumping margin would contradict the calculation of the dumping margin in 
the first place. As a result, the formulas under which antidumping duties are 
calculated are not amenable to flexible adjustments that take account of 
parties’ varied circumstances. When trade policy is relegated to mechanical 
formulas, it loses the ability to accommodate competing interests through a 
process for negotiating bargains and compromises. Even if antidumping 
could find a way to overcome the procedural and institutional biases in favor 
of petitioners, it would still be unable to take account of the interests of all 
stakeholders in a meaningful manner because the amount of antidumping 
duties would be determined by a number—the dumping margin, a number 
                                                                                                                           
 143. See supra note 26.  
 144. See supra Part I.B. It has been recognized that trade-policy decisions overlap with a 
large range of political, economic, and social agendas. See Stephen D. Cohen et al., Fun-
damentals of U.S. Foreign Trade Policy: Economics, Politics, Laws, and Issues 3–24 
(2d ed. 2003). 
 145. The Antidumping Manual published by the Import Administration of the Interna-
tional Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce provides a detailed description of 
the formulas by which the export price and the normal value are calculated in U.S. antidump-
ing proceedings. See Imp. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Antidumping Manual ch. 7 
(2009), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html.  
 146. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 9.3. And under the lesser duty 
rule, the WTO Antidumping Agreement explicitly allows the amount of antidumping duties to 
be lower than the dumping margin “if such a lower duty amount would be adequate to remove 
the injury to the domestic industry.” Id. art. 9.1. 
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that is also economically meaningless.147 To be sure, some scholars have 
called for the inclusion of a public interest clause in antidumping laws,148 
and certain jurisdictions, such as Canada,149 the European Union, and 
Australia,150 do have such a clause in their antidumping statutes. But with 
the dumping margin at the center of antidumping, a public interest clause 
could at most enable a binary policy choice—antidumping duties versus no 
antidumping duties.151 It would not be able to allow investigating authorities 
to incrementally adjust the amount of antidumping duties in a way that does 
not threaten the centrality of the dumping-margin requirement. The same 
can also be said of other proposals to enhance public participation in 
antidumping proceedings.152  
                                                                                                                           
 147. See supra Part I.A for discussions on the lack of economic justifications for anti-
dumping.  
 148. See, e.g., Claude Barfield, Anti-dumping Reform: Time to Go Back to Basics, 28 
World Econ. 719, 729–30 (2005) (arguing that antidumping analysis should be expanded to 
include an assessment of the costs and benefits of individual actions across the entire econo-
my); Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Rehabilitating Antidumping and Other Trade Remedies 
Through Cost-Benefit Analyses, J. World Trade, Apr. 1996, at 5, 23–29 (arguing that a cost-
benefit analysis should be made mandatory for antidumping and other trade remedy 
measures); Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 
315, 343 (2005) [hereinafter Cho, Dual Catastrophe] (arguing that the antidumping statute 
should be amended to include a public interest clause); Finger, supra note 33, at 69–74 (argu-
ing for substituting a “national economic interest test” for the injury test in antidumping 
proceedings). But cf. Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative Barriers As an 
Obstruction to Development, 25 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 395, 414–15 (2007) [hereinafter Cho, 
Administrative Barriers] (suggesting that developed countries use a public interest clause to 
exempt developing countries from antidumping duties).  
 149. See Finger, supra note 33, at 71–72 (describing the public interest provision in Ca-
nadian antidumping law).  
 150. See Cho, supra note 25, at 400 (commenting on the public interest clause in EU and 
Australian antidumping laws).  
 151. The EU antidumping law, for example, only provides a binary choice when it 
comes to the weighing of public interest (or “community interest” in EU law parlance) in an-
tidumping proceedings. The EU Antidumping Regulation provides that “[m]easures, as 
determined on the basis of the dumping and injury found, may not be applied where the au-
thorities, on the basis of all the information submitted, can clearly conclude that it is not in the 
Community interest to apply such measures.” EU Antidumping Regulation, supra note 7, art. 
21.1, 2009 O.J. (L 343) at 70. Under this provision, the European Commission has the discre-
tion not to impose antidumping duties where the public interest does not support them but 
does not have the discretion to impose, say, half of the amount of antidumping duties that 
would otherwise be imposed. Even with this limited set of policy options, the public interest 
clause in EU antidumping law is hard to implement and has had little practical impact. See 
Hoekman & Mavroidis, supra note 25, at 46–47. 
 152. For example, Professor Sungjoon Cho proposed to require the Department of 
Commerce to conduct a mandatory interagency consultation and a mandatory public hearing 
before the imposition of final antidumping duties. See Cho, Dual Catastrophe, supra note 148, 
at 343–44. These consultations and hearings would not have an impact on the amount of anti-
dumping duties if the amount of antidumping duties were still required to be based on the 
dumping margin.  
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Second, the dumping-margin requirement leads to democracy deficit 
because the “unfair trade” label affixed to dumping deprives the antidump-
ing process of honest debates on protectionism and its consequences. The 
idea that dumping is unfair and antidumping duties are needed to “level the 
playing field” allows politicians and import-competing industries to take the 
“rhetorical high ground” in debates on trade policy.153 Even the word dump-
ing itself carries a derogatory connotation.154 By focusing on the “unfair” 
nature of the dumped imports, antidumping allows domestic interest groups to 
appeal to the superficial righteousness of protecting domestic producers from 
import competition155 and shields the real questions about trade protectionism 
from being scrutinized and debated in a meaningful manner. Domestic peti-
tioners, for instance, do not have to admit their high costs when they can lay 
the blame on “unfair” foreign imports.156 The question of what effect anti-
dumping has on consumers and downstream users also becomes much less 
relevant when the overriding concern is about the “fairness” of the imports. 
With this “unfair trade” rhetoric hijacking the antidumping process, there 
are no honest debates on whether and at what costs the importing country 
needs trade protection in the form of antidumping duties. As a result, even if 
the procedural and institutional barriers to democratic participation in anti-
dumping proceedings were removed, the ensuing democratic participation 
would still not be meaningful because the debates would not focus on the 
true reasons for trade protection. 
The adverse impact of the democracy deficit in antidumping cannot be 
overstated. Not only does it deprive stakeholders of their right to participate 
in decisions that affect their interests, it also hinders the accomplishment of 
one broader goal: the goal of fostering informed consensus on trade 
protectionism. If a country decides to keep high import tariffs to protect its 
domestic industries after carefully weighing the costs and benefits of such a 
policy, although that policy will be unfortunate for free trade, at least the 
country will have gone through an informed process to arrive at that policy. 
A protectionist trade policy made on the basis of an informed consensus 
merely means that the time for free trade has not come yet. In that scenario, 
because there is a process permitting open and honest debate on free trade 
and protectionism, the necessary conditions for forming a future societal 
preference for free trade are preserved even though the process initially 
results in adverse policy outcomes.157 In antidumping proceedings, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 153. See Pierce, supra note 80, at 735. 
 154. Michael Kabik, The Dilemma of “Dumping” from Nonmarket Economy Countries, 
6 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 339, 345 (1992).  
 155. See Niels, supra note 52, at 485.  
 156. Michael O. Moore, Antidumping Reform in the Doha Round: A Pessimistic 
Appraisal 19 (paper presented at “The Economics of the Doha Round and the WTO,” Univ. 
of H.K., Dec. 16–17, 2005), available at http://home.gwu.edu/~mom/ad_reform_doha.pdf.  
 157. This conclusion finds support in the international political economy literature on 
trade-preference formations. As is noted by an international political economy scholar, “de-
termining the societal interests at stake” is the first step for “governments decid[ing] to engage 
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the process for open and honest debate on trade protectionism is 
compromised by the dumping-margin requirement and the “unfair trade” 
rhetoric associated with it. If a country decides to impose high antidumping 
duties to protect its domestic industries, it will not be because the country as 
a whole has decided that the benefits of trade protectionism outweigh its 
costs. Instead, it will be because the dumping-margin formulas used by the 
investigating authority happen to have produced a high dumping margin. A 
fundamental problem with antidumping, therefore, is that it hinders the 
process for seeking and reaching an informed consensus on trade 
protectionism, a process that is crucial for the broader trade agenda.158 
II. A Reform Proposal: Replacing Antidumping with 
a Country-Specific Safeguard  
The foregoing discussions set out the fundamental defects of antidump-
ing. As summarized above, the economic critiques of antidumping 
demonstrate that antidumping lacks sound economic justifications. The eco-
nomic critiques, however, fail to see through the rhetoric of antidumping 
and, as a result, do not respond to the argument that the real utility of anti-
dumping lies in its role as a safety valve for protectionist pressures. This 
Article breaks new ground by acknowledging this potential safety-valve 
function and then proceeding to examine how well antidumping performs 
that function. I argue that antidumping is indeed a faulty safety valve in that 
it provides arbitrary levels of protection for petitioners, results in unneces-
sary uncertainties for respondents, and has too low a threshold for 
activation. This Article also breaks new ground by discussing the democracy 
deficit in the context of antidumping, a problem that has larger ramifications 
for trade policy.  
The identification of the aforementioned defects of antidumping is the 
starting point for antidumping reforms. Ideally, a sound reform proposal 
should address all of the above defects: it should remove the economic irra-
tionality of antidumping, make antidumping a better safety valve, and 
reduce the democracy deficit in the antidumping process. In the meantime, 
the reform proposal must be politically feasible in order to have a realistic 
chance of approval. 
Fortunately, there does exist a trade remedy instrument that reasonably 
accomplishes all of the policy objectives identified above. Below, I propose 
to replace antidumping with that trade remedy instrument. Specifically, I 
propose to eliminate the unfair-pricing component of antidumping, increase 
                                                                                                                           
in free trade [versus] protectionism.” Cornelia Woll, Firm Interests: How Governments 
Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade 25–26 (2008) (surveying discussions of trade-
preference formations in the international political economy literature).  
 158. For example, in the 1990s, after the conclusion of the NAFTA, the United States 
made “only limited efforts to pursue bilateral free trade agreements due to a lack of political 
consensus on such agreements.” See C. O’Neal Taylor, Of Free Trade Agreements and Models, 
19 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 569, 573 (2009).  
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the injury standard under antidumping, and require public interest to be tak-
en into account in the antidumping process. As shall become clear below, 
the result of these reform measures would be to replace antidumping with a 
country-specific safeguard equipped with a heightened injury standard and a 
mandatory public interest clause.  
A. Major Elements of the Reform Proposal 
1. Eliminating the Unfair-Pricing Component of Antidumping 
The reform proposal put forward in this Article starts with a simple 
proposition: since there are no economic justifications for the unfair-pricing 
component of antidumping,159 that component of antidumping should be 
eliminated altogether. Under this reform proposal, investigating authorities 
will only need to investigate the amount of injury caused by imports, not 
whether the imports are being dumped. 
The proposal to eliminate the unfair-pricing component of antidumping, 
however, should not be equated with a proposal to abolish antidumping. 
There have been many past proposals for the wholesale abolition of anti-
dumping laws, with one prominent economist famously suggesting that 
“[t]he most appealing option is to get rid of antidumping laws and to put 
nothing in their place.”160 Many scholars have also recommended replacing 
antidumping with antitrust provisions on predatory pricing.161 But since an-
tidumping is not intended to be a defense against predatory pricing,162 
proposals to replace antidumping with antitrust are essentially the same as 
proposals to “repeal[] antidumping and replac[e] it with nothing.”163 One 
fundamental problem with these repeal proposals is that they are not politi-
cally feasible. As is widely noted, efforts to completely abolish antidumping 
                                                                                                                           
 159. See supra Part I.A.  
 160. Finger, supra note 33, at 57. For other proposals to abolish antidumping, see Caine, 
supra note 33, at 681 (advocating the repeal of the antidumping provisions of the Tariff Act of 
1930); McGee, supra note 26, at 561 (“The antidumping laws must be repealed, the sooner the 
better.”).  
 161. See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, Anti-dumping and Anti-trust in Free-Trade 
Areas 51 (1994) (arguing that antidumping law should be replaced by domestic antitrust law); 
John J. Barceló III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, 1 Mich. Y.B. Int’l Legal 
Stud. 53, 66–67 (1979) (arguing that “protection should not take the form of a special anti-
dumping law” and that “the existing domestic antitrust laws are entirely adequate to protect 
against the threat of predation from foreign dumpers”); Barfield, supra note 148, at 722–23 
(“[I]f political considerations were not present, the most economically sensible (and equitable) 
course would be to treat allegations of price discrimination and below-cost pricing as potential 
infractions against a country’s competition policy regime.”).  
 162. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.  
 163. Finger, supra note 33, at 60. 
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face steep hurdles because of the political influence of domestic interest 
groups favoring antidumping.164 
The proposal put forward here differs from the previous repeal pro-
posals in that it preserves a meaningful trade-protection mechanism for 
petitioners and trade-policy makers. It eliminates the unfair-pricing compo-
nent of antidumping, but petitioners will still be able to receive temporary 
relief from imports if they can demonstrate a sufficient level of injury. In 
other words, the proposed trade remedy instrument is all about injury, not 
about “unfair trade.” The name antidumping would become a misnomer, as 
the proposed trade remedy instrument would not target dumping anymore. 
In essence, the proposed trade remedy instrument is a safeguard, as it pro-
vides temporary trade protection in the event of injury regardless of whether 
the underlying cause of the injury is fair or unfair. 
2. A Higher Injury Standard  
With the proposed safeguard centered on injury, the key aspect of the 
reform proposal is its standard for determining that injury. As discussed 
above, the material-injury standard under current antidumping laws does not 
specify what level of injury will be considered material and does not require 
that imports be a primary or substantial cause of injury.165 As discussed 
above, not only does this injury standard favor petitioners, but it also may 
lead to the activation of the antidumping safety valve when it should not be 
activated.166  
To make antidumping a better safety valve in terms of being able to 
identify industries that truly deserve trade protection, I propose a higher in-
jury standard for the new safeguard that will replace antidumping. The 
injury standard under the proposed safeguard has two components. First, it 
requires petitioners to suffer at least a significant amount of injury or threat 
of injury before they can invoke the safeguard. The amount of injury or 
threat of injury can no longer be just “inconsequential, immaterial, or unim-
portant” as under current U.S. antidumping law.167 Second, the injury 
standard under the proposed safeguard requires that imports be at least a 
substantial cause of the injury or threat of injury to petitioners. Merely 
showing that imports are a cause of the injury, as permitted under current 
antidumping laws,168 will no longer be deemed sufficient. Consistent with 
                                                                                                                           
 164. See Cho, supra note 25, at 401 (“[R]epealing . . . the current antidumping statute [in 
the United States] appears [to be] politically infeasible considering the strong protectionist 
support within Congress.”); see also Cho, Administrative Barriers, supra note 148, at 414 
(noting that proposals to repeal antidumping remain “an academic undertaking” because of 
“the strong political appeal of antidumping measures”); Finger, supra note 33, at 57 
(“[S]traightforward repeal of antidumping would likely be difficult to achieve.”). 
 165. See supra notes 123–134 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 167. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (2011).  
 168. See supra notes 127–130, 133–134 and accompanying text.  
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the basic goal of the new safeguard, these two injury requirements would 
prevent unnecessary protection of industries that do not suffer significant in-
juries caused by imports.  
In terms of language, the proposed safeguard can borrow language from 
the current global safeguard’s injury standard. The global safeguard, spelled 
out in Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Safe-
guards, requires that increased imports cause or threaten to cause “serious 
injury” to domestic producers.169 This “serious injury” language captures, 
approximately, the injury standard proposed for the new safeguard in terms 
of both the extent of injury and the causal link between imports and injury. 
As for the extent of injury, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards defines the 
term “serious injury” as “a significant overall impairment in the position of 
a domestic industry.”170 The Appellate Body of the WTO has indicated that 
this serious-injury standard is a “very high one,” “much higher” than the 
material-injury standard used in the Antidumping Agreement, the Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the GATT 1994.171 
The Appellate Body justified this interpretation of the serious-injury 
standard by citing the “extraordinary nature” of the global safeguard and 
by pointing out that “the application of a safeguard measure does not de-
pend upon ‘unfair’ trade actions, as is the case with antidumping or 
countervailing measures.”172 But since the distinction between “fair” and 
“unfair” trade in antidumping is fictitious, antidumping is indeed no less 
“extraordinary” than the global safeguard, with both being “ordinary pro-
tection” for domestic producers.173 It would be appropriate, therefore, for 
the antidumping-converted safeguard to require the same extent of injury 
as the global safeguard.  
As for the causal link component of the injury standard, Article 4.2(b) 
of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards states that a serious-injury determina-
tion under the global safeguard requires a causal relationship between 
increased imports and injury, and that factors other than imports must not be 
attributed to increased imports in the determination of the causal relation-
ship.174 WTO case law has interpreted this causal relationship to require “a 
                                                                                                                           
 169. GATT 1994, supra note 122, art. XIX:1(a); WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra 
note 10, art. 2(1).  
 170. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 4(1)(a).  
 171. Appellate Body Report, United States—Safeguard Measures on Fresh, Chilled or 
Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, ¶ 124, WT/DS177/AB/R, 
WT/DS178/AB/R (May 1, 2001) [hereinafter US—Lamb]; Technical Information on Safe-
guard Measures: Causation, World Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
safeg_e/safeg_info_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012).  
 172. US—Lamb, supra note 171, ¶ 124 (quoting Appellate Body Report, Argentina—
Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, ¶ 94, WT/DS121/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999)). 
 173. See Finger, supra note 66, at 34 (“Antidumping is ordinary protection with a grand 
public relations program.”). 
 174. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 4.2(b).  
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genuine and substantial relationship of cause and effect”175 and has required 
investigating authorities to distinguish the injury caused by increased im-
ports from that caused by other factors.176 This causal relationship, however, 
does not require that “increased imports on their own must be capable of 
causing serious injury.”177 
It is important to note that there are flaws with the causation analysis 
under both the serious-injury standard under the global safeguard and the 
material-injury standard under antidumping. The causation analysis under 
the global safeguard has been criticized for substituting correlation or 
coincidence for causation and for trying to determine the causal effect of 
imports when import quantities are simultaneously determined along with 
other variables.178 Similar criticisms have been directed at the causation 
analysis under the material-injury standard under antidumping as well.179 
While suggesting that the new safeguard borrow the injury standard 
currently used by the global safeguard, I do not aim to resolve these issues 
that have long plagued the causation analysis under the global safeguard. 
Nor do I aim to propose ways to improve the causation analysis under 
current antidumping laws. The limited goal of this Article regarding injury is 
to identify an area where an improvement can be readily made—that is, to 
elevate the injury standard under antidumping from material injury to 
serious injury while leaving the complexities surrounding the determination 
of injury to future case-law development.  
It is also important to note that the new safeguard proposed in this Arti-
cle does not borrow all of the elements of the injury standard currently used 
under the global safeguard. Specifically, the new safeguard will not require 
that the serious injury be caused by “increased quantities of imports” as a 
result of “unforeseen developments” as the global safeguard does.180 As was 
                                                                                                                           
 175. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures on Im-
ports of Wheat Gluten from the European Communities, ¶ 69, WT/DS166/AB/R (Dec. 22, 
2000).  
 176. Id. ¶ 68. 
 177. Id. ¶ 70.  
 178. See Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 523, 
557–58 (2004) (criticizing the causation analysis under the global safeguard).  
 179. See Presley L. Warner, Canada-United States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing 
Antidumping with Antitrust, 23 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 791, 807–08 (1992) (describing crit-
icisms by Ronald Cass and Alan Sykes of the injury-causation analysis in U.S. antidumping 
and countervailing duty proceedings).  
 180. Article XIX of the GATT 1994 states: 
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations in-
curred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, 
any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such in-
creased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury 
to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the 
contracting party shall be free . . . to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to 
withdraw or modify the concession.  
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pointed out by Professor Alan Sykes, this requirement under the global 
safeguard suffers many conceptual problems that threaten the coherency of 
the global safeguard.181 As Sykes argued, the Appellate Body of the WTO 
has not established a clear “baseline against which the existence of ‘in-
creased quantities’ [of imports] . . . [would be] assessed.”182 Nor has it 
provided any guidance for many important questions surrounding the phrase 
“unforeseen developments,” for example, “At what point in time must the 
events in question have been unforeseen . . . ? What if the last concession on 
the product in question was decades ago . . . ?”183 Furthermore, an issue that 
has so far escaped scholarly attention is the apparent self-contradiction of 
the unforeseen-developments requirement: the trade negotiators must not 
have foreseen the developments necessitating a specific global safeguard 
measure, but the fact that the global safeguard is in place at all indicates that 
the trade negotiators did foresee the possibility of the use of global safe-
guard measures in certain situations. By discarding this requirement of the 
global safeguard, the new safeguard proposed in this Article will be able to 
avoid these conceptual problems. 
3. No Nondiscrimination Requirement 
One defining feature of the new safeguard proposed in this Article is 
that it does not require nondiscrimination as to the source of imports as the 
global safeguard does.184 The new safeguard, therefore, can be imposed on a 
                                                                                                                           
GATT 1994, supra note 122, art. XIX:1(a) (emphasis added). The WTO Agreement on Safe-
guards, which was entered into to implement Article XIX of the GATT 1994, dropped the 
phrase “unforeseen developments” from its text. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards only 
provides that  
[a] Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has 
determined . . . that such product is being imported into its territory in such in-
creased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry 
that produces like or directly competitive products.  
WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 2(1) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
Subsequent WTO cases have revived the unforeseen-developments requirement by 
interpreting Article 2(1) of the WTO Agreement on Safeguards to require a finding that the 
serious injury was a result of “developments occurring after the negotiation of the relevant 
tariff concession which it would not be reasonable to expect that the negotiators of the country 
making the concession could and should have foreseen at the time when the concession was 
negotiated.” See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products, ¶ 89, WT/DS98/AB/R (Dec. 14, 1999) (quoting Report of the 
Intersessional Working Party on the Complaint of Czechoslovakia Concerning the Withdrawal 
by the United States of a Concession Under the Terms of Article XIX, ¶ 9, GATT/CP/106 (Mar. 
27, 1951)). 
 181. See Sykes, supra note 178, at 539–42.  
 182. Id. at 541. 
 183. Id. at 540. 
 184. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 2(2) (“Safeguard measures 
shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its source.”). 
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country-by-country basis as antidumping duties can. For this reason, the 
new safeguard can be officially referred to as a country-specific safeguard. 
The concept of a country-specific safeguard is not new in the framework 
of the GATT/WTO. In the 1960s and 1970s, country-specific safeguards 
were adopted when Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland, 
and Romania joined the GATT.185 Currently, the WTO allows the use of a 
“China safeguard”—a country-specific safeguard against imports from Chi-
na put in place because of a special obligation China undertook on its 
accession to the WTO.186 These country-specific safeguards, however, can 
only be used against imports from specific countries. What this Article pro-
poses is essentially a generally available country-specific safeguard that 
could be used against imports from any WTO member.  
It should be noted that this Article was not the first to propose a general-
ly available country-specific safeguard. During the GATT Tokyo Round 
negotiations in the 1970s on a Safeguards Code, “a number of GATT con-
tracting parties, notably the European Community, took the position that a 
new Safeguards Code ought to authorize protectionist measures” to be ap-
plied selectively to target countries responsible for the market disruption 
that necessitates the safeguards.187 But efforts to allow the selective use of 
GATT safeguards “met with strong resistance from developing countries 
. . . . [and] [n]o agreement could be reached” because of the selectivity is-
sue.188 Marco C.E.J. Bronckers subsequently argued that “the traditional 
interpretation of [the] non-discrimination [requirement under GATT Article 
XIX] condone[d] selectivity to a considerable extent,” that selectivity should 
be explicitly recognized to “improve equity, both in official safeguard ac-
tions as well as in ‘grey area’ measures,” and that “a recognition of 
selectivity could unblock the negotiations on a new Safeguards Code.”189 
What distinguishes the country-specific safeguard proposal put forward 
in this Article from past selective-safeguard proposals are the contexts of 
those proposals. The selective safeguards proposed in the past were not pro-
posed to replace antidumping; instead, they were proposed as stand-alone 
                                                                                                                           
 185. Dukgeun Ahn, Restructuring the WTO Safeguard System, in The WTO Trade 
Remedy System: East Asian Perspectives 11, 22 n.38 (Mitsuo Matsushita et al. eds., 
2006). 
 186. See Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China art. 16, opened for 
signature Nov. 10, 2001, WT/L/432 [hereinafter China Accession Protocol] (providing for a 
“transitional product-specific safeguard mechanism.”). China’s agreement to allow this so-
called China safeguard is one of many special obligations China undertook on its accession to 
the WTO in 2001. For a general overview of China’s “WTO-plus” obligations, see Julia Ya 
Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal 
System, 37 J. World Trade 483 (2003). 
 187. M.C.E.J. Bronckers, Selective Safeguard Measures in Multilateral 
Trade Relations: Issues of Protectionism in GATT European Community and United 
States Law 4 (1985). 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 5. 
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reform measures to improve GATT safeguards.190 If adopted, the selective 
safeguards would be applied in addition to, not in lieu of, antidumping. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that developing countries opposed the selective use 
of GATT safeguards, because that use would only add to the significant disad-
vantages those countries were already facing. By contrast, the country-specific 
safeguard proposed in this Article would replace antidumping. If adopted, the 
country-specific safeguard would be applied in lieu of, not in addition to, an-
tidumping. Countries whose products are likely to be subject to antidumping 
and safeguard measures will not automatically oppose the selectivity of the 
country-specific safeguard, because the selectivity of the country-specific 
safeguard will replace the selectivity of antidumping and will in all likeli-
hood be a lesser evil for those countries for the reasons presented in this 
Article. 
4. No Compensation Requirement 
Another important feature of the country-specific safeguard proposed 
in this Article is that it will not require compensation as the global safe-
guard does in certain situations.191 A WTO member that imposes a 
country-specific safeguard would not have to provide compensation to 
countries affected by the safeguard as long as the safeguard is otherwise 
consistent with the WTO. This feature of the country-specific safeguard is 
intended to replicate the current practice under antidumping, which does 
not require compensation.192 
                                                                                                                           
 190. Jan Woznowski comments that “[t]here were no negotiations, as such, of antidump-
ing during the Tokyo Round,” but that negotiations on the Subsidies Code during the Tokyo 
Round “resulted in a number of amendments to the Kennedy Round Antidumping Code.” 
These amendments imposed more discipline on the users of antidumping. There were no 
negotiations aimed at eliminating antidumping during the Tokyo Round. Jan Woznowski, 
Anti-dumping Negotiations in the GATT and the WTO: Some Personal Reflections, in Op-
portunities and Obligations: New Perspectives on Global and U.S. Trade Policy 89, 
91–92 (Terence P. Stewart ed., 2009). 
 191. Under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, a country imposing a global safeguard is 
required to “endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of concessions and other 
obligations to that existing under GATT 1994 between it and the exporting . . . [countries] which 
would be affected” by the imposition of the global safeguard. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, 
supra note 10, art. 8(1). If the country imposing the global safeguard and the affected exporting 
countries cannot reach an agreement on an adequate means of trade compensation, the “affected 
exporting [countries]” are authorized “to suspend . . . the application of substantially equivalent 
concessions or other obligations under GATT 1994, to the trade of the [country] applying the 
safeguard measure” upon providing a timely notice to the WTO. Id. art. 8(2). This “right of 
suspension,” however, “[should] not be exercised for the first three years that a safeguard measure 
is in effect . . . [if] the safeguard has been taken as a result of an absolute increase in imports 
. . . .” Id. art. 8(3). 
 192. There are no compensation requirements under the WTO Antidumping Agreement. 
See WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92.  
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5. “Tariffs Only” and the Determination of Tariffs 
Under the country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article, countries 
will only be allowed to impose extra tariffs on imports subject to the safe-
guard. They will not be allowed to impose quantitative restrictions such as 
quotas on such imports. Again, this proposal is intended to ensure continuity 
with antidumping, which is a tariff-only remedy. In addition, this proposal is 
consistent with the WTO’s preference for tariffs over quantitative re-
strictions. The disfavoring of quantitative restrictions by the WTO is most 
explicitly expressed in Article XI of the GATT 1994, which generally pro-
hibits quantitative restrictions on imports and exports.193 The rationales for 
the preference for tariffs over quantitative restrictions are multifold: while 
tariffs allow the most efficient competitor to supply imports, “quantitative 
restrictions usually have a trade distorting effect, their allocation can be 
problematic, and their administration may not be transparent.”194 Given 
these detrimental effects of quantitative restrictions and the long-standing 
efforts by the world trade community to phase them out,195 it would be a 
sensible policy for the country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article to 
eliminate quantitative restrictions. The global safeguard, by contrast, still 
permits the use of quantitative restrictions in definitive safeguard 
measures.196 
The next question is how the amount of extra tariffs will be determined 
under the country-specific safeguard. By virtue of the elimination of the 
dumping-margin requirement, the country-specific safeguard will have no 
set formulas by which to calculate the amount of extra tariffs. The amount 
of extra tariffs under the country-specific safeguard will be as high as the 
                                                                                                                           
 193. Under Article XI of the GATT 1994, except under rare circumstances, WTO mem-
bers are required not to institute or maintain quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, 
“through quotas or import or export licenses or other measures.” GATT 1994, supra note 122, 
art. XI.  
 194. See Panel Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Prod-
ucts, ¶ 9.63, WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey—Textiles]; see also Chad P. 
Bown & Rachel McCulloch, Nondiscrimination and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, 2 
World Trade Rev. 327, 346–47 (2003) (“[S]afeguards applied through quantitative re-
strictions discriminate in favor of suppliers whose market shares have been falling and against 
suppliers whose market shares have been rising.”).  
 195. “Participants in the Uruguay Round negotiations recognized the overall detrimental 
effects of non-tariff border restrictions” that had long been used in sectors such as agriculture 
and textiles and clothing and tried to devise mechanisms to phase out those restrictions. Those 
efforts were reflected in a number of Uruguay Round agreements, including the GATT 1994 
Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions, the Agreement on Safeguards, the Agree-
ment on Agriculture, and the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. Turkey—Textiles, supra 
note 194, ¶ 9.65. 
 196. The WTO Agreement on Safeguards requires provisional safeguard measures to 
“take the form of tariff increases.” See WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 6. 
But there is not a similar requirement for definitive safeguard measures. See Proclamation No. 
7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553, 10,555 (Mar. 7, 2002). The global safeguard imposed by the Unit-
ed States on certain steel products in 2002, for example, consisted of both tariff measures and 
tariff rate quotas. Id. 
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political “market” in the importing country can bear, subject to a general re-
quirement that the amount of extra tariffs be no more than necessary to 
remedy or prevent serious injury to domestic industries.197  
There are two reasons for not specifying a formula for the calculation of 
the amount of extra tariffs under the country-specific safeguard. First, the 
use of any formulas in calculating the amount of extra tariffs will require af-
ter-the-fact data and will therefore invite the uncertainty problem that the 
country-specific safeguard is designed to avoid.198 Second, as explained in 
more detail below, by not specifying a formula for calculating extra tariffs, 
the country-specific safeguard will break from the number-crunching pro-
cess of antidumping and return trade remedies to a context-rich political 
process that emphasizes bargaining and compromise among conflicting in-
terests.  
6. A Mandatory Public Interest Clause 
The country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article will have a 
mandatory public interest clause. Specifically, investigating authorities will 
be required to provide adequate opportunities for all parties affected by the 
country-specific safeguard to submit their views and evidence on the pro-
posed safeguard and will be required to take into account such views and 
evidence in deciding whether the imposition of the safeguard would be in 
the public interest. Both the global safeguard and the China safeguard cur-
rently have such a public interest clause.199 But as discussed above, a public 
interest clause for antidumping would be fundamentally at odds with the 
centrality of the dumping-margin requirement in antidumping.200 Because 
there is no dumping-margin requirement under the country-specific safe-
guard, however, a public interest clause would be as good a fit for the coun-
country-specific safeguard as it is for the global safeguard and the China 
safeguard. Along with the elimination of the dumping-margin requirement, 
the public interest clause is intended to transform the trade remedy process 
                                                                                                                           
 197. The global safeguard has a similar requirement. Under the global safeguard, a coun-
try can apply safeguard measures “only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious 
injury and to facilitate adjustment.” See WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 
5(1). 
 198. See supra Part I.B.2.  
 199. WTO Agreement on Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 3(1) (“[The global safeguard] 
investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and public hearings 
or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other interested parties could 
present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the presentations of 
other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether the application of a safeguard 
measure would be in the public interest.”); China Accession Protocol, supra note 186, art. 
16(5) (“Prior to application of a measure pursuant to paragraph 3, the WTO Member taking 
such action shall provide reasonable public notice to all interested parties and provide ade-
quate opportunity for importers, exporters and other interested parties to submit their views 
and evidence on the appropriateness of the proposed measure and whether it would be in the 
public interest.”). 
 200. See supra text accompanying notes 148–152.  
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from a mechanical one based on formulas and number-crunching to a politi-
cal one based on bargaining and compromise. 
7. Fixed Duration, but No Limits on Frequency of Use 
The country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article will be required 
to have a fixed duration. Under antidumping, an antidumping order is 
required to “be terminated on a date not later than five years from its 
imposition . . . .”201 An antidumping order may remain in force after the five-
year period is over if the investigating authority determines “that the expiry 
of the [order] would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of 
dumping and injury.”202 What this amounts to is a maximum period of five 
years for antidumping orders with possible extensions by five-year 
increments. Similarly, the country-specific safeguard proposed to replace 
antidumping will be required to have a duration not exceeding a maximum 
period of time. For the sake of continuity, the maximum period of time 
allowed for the country-specific safeguard could be five years, as under 
antidumping (assuming no continuation of antidumping orders). The 
duration of the country-specific safeguard, however, can be shorter than the 
maximum period of time. To give importers and foreign producers a 
maximum level of certainty, the exact duration of a country-specific 
safeguard will be required to be fixed and made public at the time of the 
safeguard decision. 
Once the fixed duration of a country-specific safeguard lapses, an im-
porting country will be allowed to impose a new country-specific safeguard 
on the same products for subsequent periods of time not exceeding five 
years each, provided that the injury standard continues to be met. What this 
Article proposes, therefore, is a fixed duration for each country-specific 
safeguard measure but no limits on how many times a country-specific safe-
guard measure can be applied to the same products. This contrasts with the 
global safeguard, which has limits on the frequency of its use for the same 
products.203 
                                                                                                                           
 201. WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 92, art. 11.3. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, a global safeguard may not be reintro-
duced for a period of time at least as long as that during which a measure was previously in 
place, “provided that the period of non-application is at least two years.” WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards, supra note 10, art. 7(5). The limited exception to this rule is that a global safe-
guard  
with a duration of 180 days or less may be applied again to the import of a product 
if: at least one year has elapsed since the date of introduction of a [global safe-
guard] on the import of that product . . . and such a [global safeguard] has not been 
applied on the same product more than twice in the five-year period immediately 
preceding the date of introduction of the measure.  
Id. art. 7(6).  
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B. Why the Country-Specific Safeguard? 
In this Section, I will demonstrate that the country-specific safeguard 
proposed in this Article reasonably addresses the fundamental defects of an-
tidumping identified in Part I and, at a minimum, represents a net 
improvement over antidumping. I will first argue that the proposed country-
specific safeguard is superior to antidumping in ways that are important for 
trade policy. I will then discuss the political feasibility of the proposal. 
1. The Advantages of the Country-Specific Safeguard over Antidumping 
The country-specific safeguard proposed above is superior to antidump-
ing in every aspect in which antidumping is lacking. Specifically, the 
country-specific safeguard is based on sound economic principles, is a better 
safety valve, and, most importantly, reduces the democracy deficit in trade 
remedies.  
The first advantage the proposed country-specific safeguard holds over 
antidumping is that it is based on sound economic principles. By eliminating 
the unfair-pricing component of antidumping, the country-specific safeguard 
would not require a finding of dumping, which, as discussed earlier, is an 
economically meaningless concept in the vast majority of circumstances.204 
Given the central role antidumping currently plays in trade remedies, the 
elimination of the unfair-pricing component of antidumping would go a 
long way toward restoring the economic rationales for trade remedies. 
Moreover, the heightened injury standard under the country-specific safe-
guard is also consistent with the economics of antidumping, as the only 
economically sound justification for antidumping is that it may serve as a 
safety valve for protectionist pressures.205 The heightened injury standard 
under the country-specific safeguard would shift the focus of trade remedies 
from “unfair trade” to injury, where it should be. 
The second advantage the proposed country-specific safeguard holds 
over antidumping is that it is a better safety valve than antidumping. Despite 
its economic infirmities, one redeeming feature of antidumping is that it po-
tentially serves as a safety valve that can be used to ease protectionist 
pressures. But as discussed earlier, antidumping is a faulty safety valve: it 
provides arbitrary levels of protection for petitioners, results in unnecessary 
uncertainties for respondents, and has too low a standard for activation.206 
The country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article is a superior safety 
valve to antidumping in each of these aspects. First, unshackled from the 
need to base the amount of extra tariffs on the dumping margin, or, for that 
matter, on any mechanical formulas, the country-specific safeguard will be 
able to provide a level of protection that is tailored to the level of threat 
posed by imports. This will enable petitioners to avoid the situation illustrat-
                                                                                                                           
 204. See supra Part I.A.  
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 68–87. 
 206. See supra Part I.B. 
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ed by Table B in Part I.B.1, where a foreign producer that causes a high level 
of injury will get away with a low amount of antidumping duties because it 
manages to produce a low dumping margin.207 Second, the country-specific 
safeguard provides much-needed certainty for respondents. No matter how 
high the safeguard tariffs might be, they will be fixed for the duration of the 
safeguard and will be made known at the time of the safeguard decision. 
There is no need to adjust the amount of the safeguard tariffs as time goes by 
because it is no longer tied to a metric, like the dumping margin, that varies 
over time.208 Finally, the country-specific safeguard will have a better activa-
tion mechanism than antidumping because of its higher injury standard. The 
higher injury standard under the country-specific safeguard will reduce in-
stances of false positives by ensuring that the country-specific safeguard will 
be invoked only when imports cause serious injury.209  
The third and perhaps the most important advantage the country-specific 
safeguard holds over antidumping is that it will reduce the democracy deficit 
in the trade remedy process. With the dumping-margin requirement removed 
and a public interest clause in place, the country-specific safeguard will be 
better able to take account of the interests of all parties affected in determin-
ing whether to impose the safeguard and in determining the level of 
safeguard tariffs. Even without the public interest clause, the country-
specific safeguard would still be able to expand the public’s participation in 
the trade-protection process. This is because under the country-specific 
safeguard, parties arguing against trade protection will no longer be accused 
of supporting unfair trade, and politicians and investigating authorities will 
no longer have the political cover they enjoy under antidumping for protec-
tionist tariffs.210 This will elevate the bargaining position of consumers and 
downstream users of imports in the broader public discourse on trade pro-
tectionism to where it should be—a level that is equal with that of domestic 
producers. Consequently, the ensuing public debate on trade protectionism 
will focus on the real questions: questions about whether the country should 
engage in trade protectionism and who should bear the cost of that protec-
tionism. 
Seen in this light, the most valuable contribution the country-specific 
safeguard makes to the trade remedy process is to provide a forum where in-
terest groups compete to have their interests translated into trade policy. The 
society as a whole will sort out its collective preference or nonpreference for 
free trade through this trade-protection process. A trade remedy process 
with maximum democratic participation will help level the playing field that 
is currently tilted in favor of parties against free trade and thus help promote 
trade liberalization.211 Even if it does not result in trade liberalization, it will 
                                                                                                                           
 207. See supra Table B. 
 208. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 209. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 210. See supra text accompanying notes 153–158. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 157–158. 
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at least channel the debates on trade liberalization in the direction of informed 
consensus. By contrast, antidumping delays, if not prevents, the formation of a 
societal consensus on trade liberalization by deflecting public debates away 
from questions about trade protectionism and its cost for society. In this sense, 
antidumping is self-perpetuating: the democracy deficit in antidumping leads 
to a societal bias against trade liberalization, and the societal bias against trade 
liberalization in turn lends support to the use of antidumping.212 The country-
specific safeguard proposed in this Article can help break this cycle by forcing 
societies to engage in open and honest debates on trade protectionism.  
2. The Political Feasibility of the Country-Specific Safeguard 
Not only does the country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article 
represent a net improvement over antidumping, but it is politically feasible, 
making antidumping reforms a goal well within reach even in today’s not-
so-ideal political environment for trade.213 
A key reason for the political feasibility of the proposed country-specific 
safeguard is that it preserves an effective trade-protection mechanism that 
could be readily used in the event of a sufficient level of injury to domestic in-
dustries. Compared to the global safeguard, the country-specific safeguard is 
much more user friendly: it does not require nondiscrimination or compensa-
tion, and petitioners can invoke it as many times as they can prove injury. 
Although petitioners will have to meet a higher injury standard and will lose 
the “unfair trade” cover they have been enjoying under antidumping, they 
will benefit from not having to demonstrate dumping, an exercise that, as 
analyzed in Part I.B.1, does not always favor them. In short, petitioners will 
not be asked to give up antidumping for nothing; instead, they will get 
something in return that they can rely on in the event of injury. 
Not only will petitioners still have a meaningful trade-protection mech-
anism under the country-specific safeguard, but they may even be better off 
under the country-specific safeguard than under antidumping. As illustrated 
in Tables A and B in Part I.B.1, under antidumping petitioners have to take 
their chances with how the dumping-margin calculations will come out for 
the respondents; it is not guaranteed that the respondents that cause large 
amounts of injury will receive high antidumping duty rates.214 The realiza-
tion by petitioners that it might be in their self-interest to favor the 
country-specific safeguard over antidumping would be crucial to the polit-
ical feasibility of the country-specific safeguard.  
Another key reason for the political feasibility of the country-specific 
safeguard is its incremental nature. To be sure, the proposed country-specific 
safeguard is nothing short of revolutionary in terms of its reconception of 
the nature of trade remedies: it eliminates the concept of “unfair” trade rem-
                                                                                                                           
 212. See supra Part I.C. 
 213. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text for discussions on growing protection-
ist pressures and deteriorating support for free trade. 
 214. See supra Part I.B.1 and Table A. 
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edies in exchange for a no-fault regime that forces importing countries to 
engage in honest debates on trade protectionism. But the proposed country-
specific safeguard is also incremental because all of its major elements are 
already in use by various existing trade remedy instruments. As discussed 
earlier, the country-specific nature of the safeguard is modeled after the 
China safeguard,215 the higher injury standard of the safeguard is already 
being practiced in some respects under the global safeguard,216 a public in-
terest clause is already found in both the global safeguard and the China 
safeguard,217 and all other elements of the safeguard—the “tariff only” re-
quirement, no nondiscrimination, no compensation, and no limits on 
frequency of use—are essentially inherited from current antidumping 
laws.218 All else being equal, this incremental nature of the reform pro-
posal will increase its chance of approval. 
The political feasibility of the country-specific safeguard, however, does 
not mean that all petitioners will heartily accept the reform proposal. The 
point is that the country-specific safeguard is the most feasible of all possi-
ble alternatives and points in the right direction for trade remedy reforms. 
With a reasonable amount of prodding and compromise, the goals of trade 
remedy reforms are at least theoretically achievable under this reform pro-
posal. 
C. Why Not the Global Safeguard? 
A discussion of why antidumping should be replaced by the country-
specific safeguard proposed in this Article would be incomplete without a 
discussion of why the same outcome could not be achieved by replacing an-
tidumping with a safeguard that is already in use: the global safeguard. 
Indeed, some commentators have suggested doing just that—replacing anti-
dumping with the global safeguard.219 In this Section, I will argue that many 
problematic features of the global safeguard prevent it from becoming an ef-
fective replacement for antidumping. I will further argue that those 
problematic features of the global safeguard lead to a mismatch between the 
design of the global safeguard and the kind of trade protection demanded by 
                                                                                                                           
 215. China Accession Protocol, supra note 186.  
 216. See supra notes 169–173 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra Part II.A.3–5, 7. 
 219. See Barfield, supra note 148, at 730–31 (advocating for replacing antidumping with 
the global safeguard); see also Caine, supra note 33, at 718–24 (arguing that the “escape 
clause” is a better approach to regulating the effects of import competition). But see Greg 
Mastel, Antidumping Laws and the U.S. Economy 101–02 (arguing against replacing an-
tidumping with the global safeguard). J. Michael Finger, Francis Ng, and Sonam Wangchuk 
have also called for replacing antidumping with a more effective safeguard mechanism, ob-
serving that the “key characteristic of a sensible safeguard procedure is that it treats domestic 
interests that would be harmed by an import restriction equally with those domestic interests 
that would benefit.” Finger et al., supra note 71, at 10.  
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petitioners, a mismatch that can be bridged by the country-specific safe-
guard. 
First, the global safeguard has only been used sparsely throughout its 
history. As noted earlier, between 1979 and 2007, WTO member countries 
initiated twelve global safeguard investigations per year on average, and 
applied seven global safeguard measures per year on average.220 To put those 
numbers in perspective, the corresponding numbers for antidumping actions 
during that period were 205 and 113, respectively—roughly sixteen times 
the numbers for the global safeguard.221  
Not only have WTO members not utilized the global safeguard as fre-
quently as they have utilized antidumping, but they have also been having 
a difficult time utilizing the global safeguard in a WTO-consistent manner. 
As of late 2012, WTO members have initiated WTO dispute settlement 
proceedings concerning twenty-three global safeguard measures since the 
establishment of the WTO.222 The WTO ruled on nine out of these twenty-
three disputes, and in each one of the nine cases, the WTO found the global 
safeguard in question to not have been applied in accordance with WTO 
rules.223 In striking down these global safeguard measures, however, the 
WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body failed to articulate 
coherent principles for the use of the global safeguard, confounding the al-
ready “difficult conceptual and interpretive issues” arising under the texts of 
                                                                                                                           
 220. World Trade Report 2009, supra note 13, at 133. 
 221. Id. 
 222. A list of WTO dispute settlement proceedings concerning the global safeguard can be 
found at the WTO’s website. WTO Secretariat, Disputes by Agreement, World Trade Org., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A18 (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2012). This tally counts separate proceedings initiated by different countries against 
the same global safeguard measure as one WTO dispute. This tally does not include cases in 
which a request for consultation was filed but a dispute settlement panel was not requested.  
 223. The WTO ruled on five disputes concerning global safeguard measures prior to 
March 2002: Korea—Dairy, Argentina—Footwear, US—Wheat Gluten, US—Lamb, and US—
Line Pipe. See id. In each of the five disputes the WTO held that the application of the global 
safeguard in question was inconsistent with WTO rules. See Yong-Shik Lee, Safeguard 
Measures: Why Are They Not Applied Consistently with the Rules?: Lessons for Competent 
National Authorities and Proposal for the Modification of the Rules on Safeguards, 36 J. 
World Trade 641, 642–43 (2002). Four more disputes over global safeguard measures have 
been decided by the WTO since March 2002, and the WTO dispute settlement panel or the 
Appellate Body ruled against the country imposing the global safeguard measure in each one 
of the disputes. WTO Legal Affairs Div., One-Page Case Summaries: Argentina—
Preserved Peaches (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds238sum_e.pdf; WTO Legal Affairs Div., One-Page Case Summar-
ies: Chile—Price Band System (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds207sum_e.pdf; WTO Legal Affairs Div., One-Page Case 
Summaries: US—Steel Safeguards (2012), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds248sum_e.pdf; WTO Secretariat, Dominican Repub-
lic—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Polypropylene Bags and Tubular Fabric, World 
Trade Org., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds415_e.htm (last updated 
June 6, 2012). 
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Article XIX of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.224 These 
conceptual and interpretive issues include, among others, issues concerning 
the standard of review, the demonstration of unforeseen developments, the 
nondiscriminatory application of the global safeguard, the demonstration of 
increases in imports, and the determination of serious injury and causa-
tion.225  
Aside from the lack of clarity in the rules interpreting the requirements 
of the global safeguard, a more fundamental problem with the global safe-
guard lies with some of its requirements. Several of the requirements of the 
global safeguard—specifically the nondiscrimination requirement, the com-
pensation requirement, and the use-frequency restrictions—make the global 
safeguard unable to provide the kind of import relief desired by petitioners 
and trade-policy makers in many, if not most, situations. First, the nondis-
crimination requirement forces import restrictions under the global 
safeguard to be applied to all imports, irrespective of their source.226 Dis-
turbances to patterns of world trade, however, often come from 
particularized sources, necessitating trade remedies that target a specific 
country.227 The global safeguard’s nondiscrimination requirement, therefore, 
ties the hands of petitioners and trade-policy makers in selecting responding 
countries in trade remedy proceedings. Second, the global safeguard’s com-
pensation requirement limits the options available to trade-policy makers in 
imposing trade remedies, as trade-policy makers might be reluctant to im-
pose a global safeguard measure if the consequence is the suspension of 
concessions by countries affected by the safeguard. Third, the restrictions on 
the use frequency of the global safeguard reduce the ability of trade-policy 
makers to use the global safeguard on an as-needed basis.228 Many of the 
market forces underlying disturbances of world trade, such as changes in 
                                                                                                                           
 224. Sykes, supra note 178, at 524. 
 225. Lee, supra note 223, at 643–66. 
 226. An importing country might have some leeway in not applying a global safeguard 
measure to products from countries with which it has signed a free trade agreement. Many re-
gional free trade areas (FTAs) have provisions exempting products of FTA parties from global 
safeguard measures. It is not clear, however, whether such exemptions are legal under WTO 
rules. Article XXIV of the GATT, which governs customs unions and FTAs, is silent as to 
whether FTA partners can or must be excluded from global safeguard measures. To address 
this issue, “the WTO dispute settlement body has relied on an invented concept of ‘parallel-
ism’ that requires the imports included in the injury determination correspond to those covered 
by the [global] safeguard measure.” Ahn, supra note 185, at 20–21. 
 227. For example, a particularized source of disturbances to patterns of world trade since 
the early 1990s has been the rise of China as a manufacturing power due to its relatively low 
costs of labor. With increasingly large amounts of cheap imports coming from China, petition-
ers demand a trade remedy instrument that can be used to limit imports from China alone. 
This demand arguably lies behind the adoption of the China safeguard in the China Accession 
Protocol. Chad P. Bown & Meredith A. Crowley, China’s Export Growth and the China Safe-
guard: Threats to the World Trading System?, 43 Can. J. Econ. 1353, 1354 (2010); see China 
Accession Protocol, supra note 186. 
 228. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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technology and costs of labor, persist over a long period of time. The re-
strictions on the use frequency of the global safeguard, however, make the 
global safeguard capable of being applied only temporarily and intermittent-
ly. This causes yet another gap between what is desired by petitioners and 
trade-policy makers and what the global safeguard can offer.  
For supporters of free trade, the stringent requirements of the global 
safeguard may be desirable because they will reduce the utilization of the 
global safeguard. The fact that the utilization of the global safeguard will be 
reduced, however, does not necessarily mean that the overall level of trade 
protection will be reduced. Under the reasonable assumption that countries 
always face pressures to protect domestic industries,229 the inability to effec-
tively use the global safeguard will force petitioners and trade-policy makers 
to turn to other more convenient trade remedy instruments. As has been 
pointed out, one of the main reasons why the global safeguard has been un-
derutilized is that protectionist efforts have been directed at antidumping, 
which is far more user friendly for petitioners.230 For the same reason, ef-
forts to “strengthen” the global safeguard have been considered “academic” 
because of the availability of a more convenient way of seeking and granting 
trade protection, that is, antidumping.231 Similarly, when it comes to reform-
ing antidumping, it should be borne in mind that any reform proposals will 
operate in a “second-best world” where protectionist pressures “inevitably” 
exist and manifest themselves in the trade remedy process.232 Seen in this 
light, proposals to replace antidumping with a trade remedy instrument as 
inflexible as the global safeguard are simply not feasible. Indeed, the fact 
that antidumping has been the preferred trade remedy instrument at a time 
when the global safeguard has always been available shows that proposals to 
replace antidumping with the global safeguard will not go very far.233  
This is not to say, however, that the goal of trade remedy reforms is to 
devise a trade remedy instrument that requires the least of petitioners and 
trade-policy makers. If that were the goal of the reforms, maintaining the 
status quo would perhaps be the best reform strategy. The goal of trade 
remedy reforms is instead to devise a trade remedy instrument that is 
demanding enough as to matters that are important for trade policy, while at 
the same time maintaining the political feasibility of the reforms. This 
Article proposes such a trade remedy instrument in the form of a new 
country-specific safeguard.  
                                                                                                                           
 229. Chad Bown makes a similar assumption in his discussion of why the global safe-
guard has been unpopular. Chad P. Bown, Why Are Safeguards Under the WTO So 
Unpopular?, 1 World Trade Rev. 47, 49 (2002).  
 230. Id. (“[F]or the period of 1987–1994, while only eighteen global safeguard measures 
were imposed, over 700 definitive antidumping measures were imposed worldwide, after the 
initiation of 1586 antidumping investigations by GATT contracting parties.”).  
 231. See Finger, supra note 33, at 58–59. 
 232. Bown, supra note 229, at 49. 
 233. See supra text accompanying notes 220–221. 
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An alternative conceptualization of the reform proposal is to see it as a 
reconfiguration of the existing global safeguard. Some of the requirements 
of the global safeguard, such as the serious-injury standard and the public 
interest clause, will be preserved because they are important for ensuring the 
intellectual integrity of trade remedies, making trade remedies function as a 
more efficient safety valve, and democratizing the trade remedy process. As 
discussed earlier, all of these goals are of great significance for trade policy. 
Some other requirements of the global safeguard, such as the nondiscrimina-
tion requirement, the compensation requirement, and the use-frequency 
restrictions, add to the burdens placed on users of the global safeguard but 
do not materially advance the aforementioned goals. Under the proposal put 
forward in this Article, those requirements will be abandoned for the sake of 
reducing resistance to the reform proposal. The final reform package may 
not be ideal, but it is a reasonable compromise that takes account of both 
principles and feasibility.  
D. Rebutting Potential Criticisms 
In this Section, I offer preemptive rebuttals to three potential criticisms 
of the country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article: that the country-
specific safeguard violates the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the 
WTO, will lead to trade wars, and will politicize the trade remedy process. 
1. The Country-Specific Safeguard and the MFN Principle 
The MFN principle is a fundamental principle of the WTO that prohib-
its WTO members from discriminating among their trading partners. The 
MFN principle is embodied in many of the most important WTO agree-
ments, including the GATT 1994,234 the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services,235 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights.236 Because the country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article 
can be applied on a country-by-country basis, the first potential criticism of 
the proposal is that it violates the MFN principle. As a matter of fact, the 
                                                                                                                           
 234. See GATT 1994, supra note 122, art. I:1 (“[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or 
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originat-
ing in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.”). 
 235. See General Agreement on Trade in Services art. II:1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [herein-
after GATS] (“With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall 
accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Mem-
ber treatment no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any 
other country.”). 
 236. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 4, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 (“With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other country shall be ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Members.”).  
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China safeguard, a country-specific safeguard currently in use, is already 
subject to this criticism.237  
The responses to the MFN criticism are twofold. First, the country-
specific safeguard proposed in this Article is no worse than antidumping in 
terms of meeting the MFN requirement. Like the country-specific safeguard, 
antidumping is applied on a country-by-country basis. Antidumping may be 
considered an exception to the MFN principle because it targets “unfair” 
trade practices.238 But as discussed earlier, the notion that dumping is unfair 
is a myth.239 Antidumping, therefore, is also a violation of the MFN princi-
ple, albeit in disguise. 
Second, it is not unprecedented for the WTO to recognize exceptions to 
the MFN principle. The General Agreement on Trade in Services, for exam-
ple, explicitly allows member countries to designate exemptions from their 
MFN obligations.240 Another example of WTO-sanctioned exceptions to the 
MFN principle is none other than the China safeguard. Indeed, it could be 
argued that a generally available country-specific safeguard like the one 
proposed in this Article mitigates the MFN concerns arising under the China 
safeguard. Instead of targeting a specific WTO member like the China safe-
guard does, the country-specific safeguard proposed in this Article puts all 
WTO members on an equal footing and therefore can be said to be nondis-
criminatory in that sense.  
2. The Country-Specific Safeguard and Trade Wars 
A second potential criticism of the country-specific safeguard proposed 
in this Article is that it will lead to trade wars. Because petitioners are not 
required to demonstrate dumping, and because there are no nondiscrimina-
tion and compensation requirements under the country-specific safeguard, 
critics may argue that petitioners and policy makers will be tempted to seek 
and grant the safeguard on a selective and retaliatory basis.  
The responses to the “trade wars” criticism are threefold. First, there are 
reasons to believe that replacing antidumping with the country-specific 
                                                                                                                           
 237. See Bown & Crowley, supra note 227, at 1354–55 (arguing that “many characteris-
tics of the China safeguard are at odds with core WTO principles” such as most favored nation 
treatment and reciprocity); see also Nicholas R. Lardy, Integrating China into the 
Global Economy 81–86 (2002) (describing the “onerous” nature of the restrictions placed 
on China as a condition of WTO membership); Tracy Elizabeth Dardick, The US-China Safe-
guard Provision, the GATT, and Thinking Long Term, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 467, 473 (2005) 
(“The [China safeguard] actively violates both the mission and the specific requirements of the 
WTO as expressed in the GATT.”). 
 238. See Philip Bentley & Aubrey Silberston, Anti-dumping and Countervail-
ing Action: Limits Imposed by Economic and Legal Theory 5 (2007) (“ ‘Dumping’ is 
another circumstance in which an exception to the MFN principle . . . can be made.”).  
 239. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 240. See GATS, supra note 235, art. II:2 (“A Member may maintain a measure incon-
sistent with paragraph 1 provided that such a measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, 
the Annex on Article II Exemptions.”). 
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safeguard would not lead to more trade remedy actions. Despite it being 
user friendly for petitioners in some respects, the country-specific safeguard 
does pose a higher hurdle for petitioners because of the higher serious-
injury standard and public interest clause. The serious-injury standard will 
ensure that only firms that suffer serious injury substantially caused by 
imports are entitled to relief and will help winnow out frivolous filings. The 
public interest clause will ensure that any decisions to impose the country-
specific safeguard will be made with a higher degree of political 
accountability than under antidumping. The fact that trade-policy makers 
will lose the “unfair trade” cover and will be held more accountable for the 
adverse effects of the safeguard on society as a whole will reign in the 
tendency to abuse the safeguard. These predictions are supported by the 
track record of the one country-specific safeguard currently in use, the 
China safeguard. In the United States, since the inception of the China 
safeguard, seven petitions for import relief have been filed under the U.S. 
statute implementing the WTO’s China-safeguard provisions.241 In five out 
of the seven petitions, the USITC determined that the action in question met 
the injury standard of the China safeguard.242 Among the five petitions for 
which the USITC made a positive injury determination, only one petition 
was approved for final relief by the President of the United States.243 As in 
the case of the global safeguard, the relatively small number of petitions 
filed for relief under the China safeguard likely has to do with the 
availability of a much more convenient trade remedy instrument—
antidumping. If antidumping were indeed replaced by the country-specific 
safeguard, the protectionist pressures currently gravitating toward 
antidumping would instead be channeled through the country-specific 
safeguard, and the utilization of the country-specific safeguard would be 
greater—perhaps much greater—than the current utilization of the China 
                                                                                                                           
 241. A listing of the China safeguard petitions can be found on the website of the U.S. 
International Trade Commission at Trade Remedy Investigations—Completed Investigations: 
Safeguard Investigations, U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_ 
remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/completed/index.htm#safeguard (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012) [hereinafter Completed Investigations]. One petition filed in August 2002 concerning 
pedestal actuators from China is not included in the list. See Pedestal Actuators from China, 
67 Fed. Reg. 54,822 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 26, 2002) (Institution and Scheduling of an 
Investigation Under Section 421(b) of the Trade Act of 1974).  
 242. See Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China, Inv. No. TA-421-
7, USITC Pub. 4085 (July 2009) (positive injury determination); Circular Welded Non-alloy 
Steel Pipe from China, Inv. No. TA-421-6, USITC Pub. 3807 (Oct. 2005) (positive injury de-
termination); Uncovered Inner Spring Units from China, Inv. No. TA-421-5, USITC Pub. 3676 
(Mar. 2004) (negative injury determination); Certain Ductile Iron Waterworks Fittings from 
China, Inv. No. TA-421-4, USITC Pub. 3657 (Dec. 2003) (positive injury determination); Cer-
tain Brake Drums and Rotors from China, Inv. No. TA-421-3, USITC Pub. 3622 (Aug. 2003) 
(negative injury determination); Certain Steel Wire Garment Hangers from China, Inv. No. 
TA-421-2, USITC Pub. 3575 (Feb. 2003) (positive injury determination); Pedestal Actuators 
from China, Inv. No. TA-421-1, USITC Pub. 3557 (Nov. 2002) (positive injury determination).  
 243. See Proclamation No. 8414, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,861 (Sept. 17, 2009); see also Com-
pleted Investigations, supra note 241.  
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safeguard. But the fact that the President of the United States denied relief 
under the China safeguard in four out of five cases indicates that petitioners 
would still have hurdles to overcome under the country-specific safeguard 
and that the country-specific safeguard is not bound to open a floodgate of 
frivolous cases. 
Second, even if the country-specific safeguard were to lead to trade 
wars, the importing countries would have gone through a more open and fair 
process for weighing the costs and benefits of those trade wars.244 In this 
sense, the aim of the reform proposed in this Article is not necessarily to re-
duce instances of trade protectionism (although that may be an incidental 
result) but to strengthen the process through which trade remedy decisions 
are being made while minimizing the adverse impacts of trade remedies dur-
ing that process. 
Third, even if import relief were to be sought and granted under the 
country-specific safeguard for retaliatory purposes, this would be no worse 
than the status quo under antidumping. Studies have established strong evi-
dence that retaliatory motives are a significant factor behind antidumping 
filings across jurisdictions.245 Retaliatory motives have also been shown to 
be at the heart of the proliferation of antidumping regimes.246 What is cur-
rently happening with antidumping is already little more than trade wars. 
There is not much room, if at all, for the country-specific safeguard pro-
posed in this Article to further exacerbate the current situation. 
3. The Country-Specific Safeguard and 
Politicizing the Trade Remedy Process 
A third potential criticism of the country-specific safeguard proposed in 
this Article is that it will politicize the trade remedy process. This criticism 
asserts that although the dumping-margin requirement is not economically 
justifiable, it does constrain petitioners’ abilities to impose antidumping du-
ties. According to this criticism, eliminating the dumping-margin 
requirement will transform the antidumping process into a pure lobbying 
contest that will almost always favor the politically powerful, typically peti-
tioners. The country-specific safeguard, therefore, may exacerbate, not 
alleviate, the biases in the trade remedy process.  
The response to this criticism is that transforming antidumping from a 
number-crunching process to a political process is precisely the point of the 
reform proposed in this Article. Granted, the dumping-margin requirement 
under antidumping forces importing countries to play by the rules when 
seeking antidumping duties. But, as analyzed in Part I.B.1, the rules import-
ing countries are required to play by have little to do with what antidumping 
                                                                                                                           
 244. See supra Part II.A.6. 
 245. See supra note 27.  
 246. See Vandenbussche & Zanardi, supra note 18, at 94.  
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is really about.247 Metaphorically, importing countries can be said to be re-
quired to roll the dice to determine the outcome of an antidumping 
proceeding. While this dice-rolling process equally constrains petitioners’ 
abilities to impose antidumping duties, it has little to do with the reasons 
why antidumping should or should not be imposed. Nor does the dice-
rolling process promote meaningful debate about why antidumping should 
or should not be imposed. Therefore, although antidumping does constrain 
importing countries’ abilities to impose antidumping duties, it does so in a 
process that does not inform trade policy.  
As for concerns that the country-specific safeguard will exacerbate bi-
ases in trade remedy proceedings, the response is that the validity of the 
country-specific safeguard does not depend on the elimination of biases in 
trade remedy proceedings. The point of the proposal in this Article is to re-
move the political cover for those biases, force those biases into the open, 
and promote honest debate about whether those biases should be main-
tained. The proposal may result in more biases, but, circumstances 
permitting, those biases would have manifested themselves in other ways in 
the trade remedy process and other trade-policy settings. 
III. Rounding Off the Reform: What to Do 
with Countervailing Duty Laws 
While the focus of this Article has so far been on antidumping, any re-
form of trade remedies has to involve the reform of countervailing duty 
laws, another important component of trade remedy laws.248 Governed by 
Article VI of the GATT 1994 and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement),249 national countervailing duty 
laws allow importing countries to impose extra tariffs on imports to offset 
certain subsidies conferred on such imports when they cause or threaten to 
cause material injury to domestic industries.250 The imposition of counter-
vailing duties by importing countries is one of two mechanisms for 
disciplining the use of subsidies: the other mechanism is direct limitations 
on subsidy practices by WTO rules.251  
The replacement of antidumping by the country-specific safeguard pro-
posed in this Article would pose a challenge for the continued application of 
countervailing duty laws. In the current trade remedy regime, antidumping 
and countervailing duties are thought to address different “unfair” trade 
                                                                                                                           
 247. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 248. See Sykes, supra note 6.  
 249. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [herein-
after SCM Agreement]. 
 250. See id. arts. 15, 19; Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Bench-
mark: The Case of Countervailing Duty Law, 19 Minn. J. Int’l L. 1, 4–5 (2010).  
 251. See Sykes, supra note 6, at 102. 
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practices, with antidumping duties targeting dumping by individual firms 
and countervailing duties targeting government-conferred subsidies. If both 
antidumping and countervailing duties are found to be warranted, they can 
be superimposed on each other because, again, they address different under-
lying trade issues. But as discussed above, the country-specific safeguard 
proposed in this Article is not about “unfair trade.” Instead it is all about in-
jury: it is intended to address the injury to domestic industries caused by 
imports, regardless of whether the injury is caused by dumping, subsidies, 
or anything else. It would be logically inconsistent, therefore, to have both a 
country-specific safeguard that addresses injury caused by all sources and a 
countervailing duty law that addresses injury caused by a particular source, 
that is, subsidies.  
But the very reason why the country-specific safeguard poses a chal-
lenge for the continued application of countervailing duty laws suggests a 
way out of the dilemma: since the country-specific safeguard already ad-
dresses injury caused by imports due to all sources, countervailing duty laws 
should be subsumed under the country-specific safeguard. In other words, 
once the country-specific safeguard is adopted, countervailing duties should 
be eliminated as an option for disciplining illegal subsidies. The practical 
outcome of this proposal will be the replacement of both antidumping and 
countervailing duty laws by the country-specific safeguard. In other words, 
what is currently dealt with under antidumping and countervailing duty laws 
will be dealt with under one unified trade remedy instrument: the country-
specific safeguard, which focuses on injury caused by imports regardless of 
the specific source of the injury. 
Although the elimination of countervailing duties as a separate mecha-
nism of disciplining illegal subsidies is required by simple logic, it happens 
that it has sound policy justifications as well. Like antidumping laws, coun-
tervailing duty laws have been subject to intense scholarly criticisms. First 
and foremost, it is not clear what the goal of countervailing duty laws is, as 
its ostensible goal—promoting economic efficiency through deterring the 
use of market-distorting subsidies—has been rejected by many scholars.252 
                                                                                                                           
 252. See generally John J. Barceló III, Subsidies and Countervailing Duties—Analysis 
and a Proposal, 9 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 779 (1977) (describing the actual functions of 
countervailing duty laws); Richard Diamond, A Search for Economic and Financial Principles 
in the Administration of United States Countervailing Duty Law, 21 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 
507 (1989) [hereinafter Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles] (examining U.S. coun-
tervailing duty law); Richard Diamond, Economic Foundations of Countervailing Duty Law, 
29 Va. J. Int’l L. 767 (1988) [hereinafter Diamond, Economic Foundations] (describing the 
historical background of countervailing duty laws and their effect on economic efficiency); 
Charles J. Goetz et al., The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the Countervailing Duty 
Law, 6 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 17 (1986); Warren F. Schwartz, Zenith Radio Corp. v. United 
States: Countervailing Duties and the Regulation of International Trade, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
297; Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting In-
ternational Trade, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 831 (1972); Sykes, supra note 29, at 213–29; Alan O. 
Sykes, Second-Best Countervailing Duty Policy: A Critique of the Entitlement Approach, 21 
Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 699 (1989). 
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Second, the substantive rules under countervailing duty laws have been crit-
icized as being incoherent. If countervailing duty laws are to be justified on 
economic efficiency grounds, that justification is belied by the fact that 
countervailing duty laws do not “distinguish [between] efficient subsidies 
and inefficient subsidies.”253 The current rules of countervailing duty laws 
are also not entirely consistent with alternative justifications such as the pro-
tection of the entitlement of domestic producers.254 Third, it has been 
established that the imposition of countervailing duties results in a net wel-
fare loss for the importing country under most circumstances.255 In light of 
these issues, Alan Sykes has called for the abolition of countervailing duty 
laws altogether.256 The outright abolition of countervailing duty laws, how-
ever, is politically infeasible, the same way the outright abolition of 
antidumping laws is politically infeasible. Using the country-specific safe-
guard as a replacement for countervailing duty laws will accomplish the 
same goal as the outright abolition of countervailing duty laws but will offer 
a path of lesser resistance toward that goal, as the country-specific safeguard 
will provide petitioners with a meaningful trade-protection mechanism in 
the event of serious injury to domestic industries.  
It is worth noting, however, that this Article does not propose to elimi-
nate all international discipline for the use of subsidies. Direct limitations on 
the use of subsidies under WTO rules, enforced through the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, should be preserved as an option for countering the 
use of subsidies. This means that only Part V of the SCM Agreement, which 
deals with countervailing measures imposed by national governments,257 
would be unnecessary under the proposal put forward in this Article. Part III 
of the SCM Agreement, which deals with subsidies “actionable” before the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body,258 would be left intact.  
                                                                                                                           
 253. See Sykes, supra note 252, at 699.  
 254. The “entitlement theory” of countervailing duty laws was first formulated by 
Charles Goetz, Lloyd Granet, and Warren Schwartz, see Goetz et al., supra note 252, at 19, 
and then was expanded by Richard Diamond, see Diamond, Economic and Financial Princi-
ples, supra note 252, at 518; see also Diamond, Economic Foundations, supra note 252, at 
776. Richard Diamond explained that the entitlement theory allows countervailing duties to be 
imposed only if a foreign subsidy lowers the marginal costs of production of the subsidy re-
cipients and thus “adversely affect[s] the entitlement of . . . [domestic] producers.” Diamond, 
Economic Foundations, supra note 252, at 784–85. But as Diamond demonstrated, many of 
the methodologies adopted in countervailing duty proceedings are incongruous with this prin-
ciple. See Diamond, Economic and Financial Principles, supra note 252, at 566–605. 
 255. See Sykes, supra note 29, at 213–29. 
 256. See id. at 263 (“[A]bolition of the countervailing duty laws might best serve the na-
tional economic interest.”).  
 257. Part V of the SCM Agreement sets out the principles and procedures WTO mem-
bers must follow in conducting countervailing investigations. See SCM Agreement, supra note 
249, arts. 10–23. 
 258. Part III of the SCM Agreement outlines the principles and procedures WTO mem-
bers must follow in challenging actionable subsidy measures before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body. See id. arts. 5–7. 
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The rationales for preserving the WTO route for tackling subsidies are 
threefold. First, a subsidy may affect market competition not just in the 
country that applies a countervailing duty measure, but also in the subsidiz-
ing country or third countries.259 Tariffs imposed under the country-specific 
safeguard will counter the effects of subsidies in the country that imposes 
the safeguard but will not alleviate the effects of subsidies in the subsidiz-
ing country or third countries.260 Only direct limitations on the use of 
subsidies could address the latter effects. Second, as Alan Sykes points 
out, direct limitations on the use of subsidies under WTO rules are likely 
to be more effective than countervailing duty measures in deterring wasteful 
subsidy practices.261 Unlike countervailing duty measures, which are “unco-
ordinated, unilateral, [and] may simply divert subsidized goods to markets 
that do not employ them . . . . , [a] successful WTO challenge to a subsidy 
practice, assuming that the losing country complies with the ruling, will in-
deed lead to the elimination of the subsidy.”262 Third and finally, preserving 
the WTO’s role in disciplining subsidies—and therefore a large portion of 
today’s subsidy rules—will contribute to the political feasibility of the re-
form proposal and the smooth transition from the current trade remedy 
regime to the proposed trade remedy regime.  
Conclusions 
This Article examines the fundamental defects of the current trade rem-
edy regime and proposes a roadmap for reforms. It argues that the 
fundamental problem with the current trade remedy regime lies in the way it 
offers import protection. This Article argues that the current trade remedy 
regime, chiefly through antidumping, provides arbitrary levels of protection 
for petitioners, results in unnecessary uncertainties for respondents, and has 
too low a threshold for activation. The current trade remedy regime also ex-
                                                                                                                           
 259. This fact is recognized by the SCM Agreement. Under the SCM Agreement, one of 
the requirements for challenging a subsidy before the WTO is that the subsidy causes “adverse 
effects to the interests of [the complaining WTO member].” Id. art. 5. One way to show “ad-
verse effects” is to demonstrate that the subsidy in question causes “serious prejudice to the 
interests of [the complaining member].” Id. art. 5(c). “Serious prejudice,” in turn, may arise 
not only when “the effect of the subsidy is a significant price undercutting by the subsidized 
product as compared with the price of a like product of another Member in the same market or 
significant price suppression, price depression or lost sales in the same market,” id. art. 6.3(c), 
but also when “the effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the imports of a like product 
of another Member into the market of the subsidizing Member,” id. art. 6.3(a), or when “the 
effect of the subsidy is to displace or impede the exports of a like product of another Member 
from a third country market,” id. art. 6.3(b). 
 260. This is because tariffs raise the price of a subsidized product only in the importing 
country, not in the subsidizing country or a third country. 
 261. See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures 25 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 186, 
2003), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/186.aos_.subsidies.pdf. 
 262. Id. at 24–25. 
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acerbates the democracy deficit in trade policy and, as a result, impedes the 
process through which societal consensus on trade protectionism is formed. 
This Article then puts forward a proposal to reform trade remedies. Under 
the proposal, antidumping and countervailing duties will be replaced by a 
new country-specific safeguard with a higher injury standard and a manda-
tory public interest clause. This country-specific safeguard eliminates the 
need to examine dumping, subsidies, or any other “unfair” practices and in-
stead focuses on the injury caused by imports to domestic industries. The 
removal of the false “unfair trade” rhetoric, along with the heightened injury 
standard and the mandatory public interest clause, will transform the current 
trade remedy regime into one that better serves as a safety valve and reduces 
democracy deficit in the trade remedy process.  
This is not to say, however, that trade remedy reforms will be easy. 
Many steps will need to be taken to implement the proposal put forward in 
this Article. Members of the WTO will need to negotiate a new agreement 
on the use of the country-specific safeguard and will need to abolish or re-
vise the Antidumping Agreement and the SCM Agreement. Then, approval 
of the reforms at the national level will need to be secured in order to enact 
the changes into law. It is almost certain that there will be many obstacles to 
the goal of trade remedy reforms, but identifying a reform strategy that is 
both principled and feasible—as done in this Article—is the important first 
step toward accomplishing that goal. 
